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ABSTRACT 
 
Understanding Participation in Wildlife Conservation Programs on Private Lands. 
(December 2008) 
Michael Gregory Sorice, B.A., Miami University; M.S., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Robert B. Ditton 
 
One major lesson derived from the implementation of the Endangered Species 
Act (ESA) over the past 30 years is that direct regulation is not the only nor the optimal 
way to protect endangered species on working lands because of an undue burden 
imposed on private landowners.  The role of a voluntary conservation program is to 
rearrange incentives so that society bears the cost rather than the landowner.  Employing 
a survey research methodology, I used theories of reasoned action and random choice to 
explore landowners’ stated preferences for conservation programs. 
I found landowners’ stated interest in compensation programs to be moderate at 
best.  For those willing to consider programs involving endangered species, associating 
land management requirements for species conservation with direct benefits to the 
landowner is important, but perhaps not as important as ensuring that the program 
provides adequate financial incentives, consideration of the term of the program, and a 
level of certainty regarding the landowner’s future obligations under the ESA.  
Landowners are not a homogenous group.  I identified two classes of landowners 
according to preferences for program structure.  One group was highly sensitive to 
program structure, aside from financial incentives, while the other was likely to 
participate if adequately compensated with financial and technical assistance.  These 
differences related to opinions on endangered species protection and dependence on their 
land for income. 
iv 
 
Voluntary incentive programs increasingly are a popular tool to maintain and 
enhance conservation; however, these programs are only successful insofar as 
landowners choose to enroll.  This research demonstrates that improving recovery efforts 
on private lands requires program administrators to have a more complete understanding 
of landowners’ views on endangered species and conservation programs in general, as 
well as their motivations for owning and operating their land.  By doing so, programs 
with broader appeal and greater efficacy can be designed and implemented. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Based on the precept that biodiversity contributes to human well-being and 
survival (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005) much attention has been devoted to 
the fact that the human footprint (i.e., population growth and resource consumption) is 
rapidly increasing biodiversity loss (Dirzo and Raven 2003).  A primary driver of 
biodiversity loss is land conversion due to agriculture, forestry and urbanization 
(Vitousek et al. 1997).  According to Stein et al. (2000), almost 60 percent of U.S. 
landscapes have been altered in major ways. 
Private lands are integral to stemming biodiversity loss because over 60 percent 
of the U.S. is privately owned (Lubowski et al. 2006).  While the United States supports 
more large-scale ecosystem than any other nation (Steelman 2002), Shen (1987) 
estimates that from 21 to 52 percent of major terrestrial ecosystem types are not 
represented in this country’s protected areas.  Additionally, protected areas tend to have 
less productive soils and occur at higher elevations compared to private lands (Scott et 
al. 2001).  Stein et al. (2000) estimate that one third of species are at risk of extinction in 
the U.S. and the GAO (1995) estimates that 90 percent of species listed as endangered 
have habitat on nonfederal lands.  Private lands constitute the greatest proportion of the 
nonfederal lands with 78% of endangered species having some or their entire habitat on 
these lands. 
Given the under-representation of ecosystem types in protected areas and the 
dependence of endangered species on private lands, successful biodiversity conservation 
hinges on the private landowner.  Early attempts to stem biodiversity loss on public and 
private lands in the United States primarily relied on regulation and enforcement 
strategies.  As a contemporary example, the Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973 has 
been a central policy tool in biodiversity protection in the United States.   
____________ 
This dissertation follows the style of Society and Natural Resources. 
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The ESA continues to enjoy much popular support despite being characterized as 
one of the most divisive environmental policies in the country (Norris 2004).  The 
support lies with the spirit of the ESA itself, which mandates efforts to recover 
threatened and endangered species, while criticism largely stems from implementation.  
A lack of funding, problems with enforcement (Bean 1998), an over-reliance on 
biologists to solve social conflict (Kellert 1994), a heavy-handed approach to 
implementation, and a bureaucratic structure that precludes organizational learning, 
flexibility, and adaptability (Clark 1997) has led to a policy that is effective at preventing 
extinction but ineffective at promoting recovery (Norris 2004).   
The command-and-control approach of the ESA (as originally implemented) 
requires landowners to fully bear the costs of recovery even though society gains 
benefits from increased biodiversity.  It unintentionally creates perverse incentives for 
landowners to manage property in ways that harm endangered species (e.g., Lueck and 
Michael 2003) and alienates land stewards who might otherwise take steps to protect 
endangered species on their own.  Information collection about species populations and 
conservation on private land consequently occurs at suboptimal levels because, in most 
cases, private landowners can refuse to allow the federal government to access their land 
(Polasky and Doremus 1998).  Since the implementation of the ESA as a tool to protect 
imperiled species, private landowners have had little reason to engage in beneficial land 
management practices that help listed species (Bean 1998). 
Within the last two decades the use of incentive programs as a means to help 
protect endangered species on private lands has increased greatly (e.g., Parkhurst and 
Shogren 2003; Land Trust Alliance 2005).  Incentives work by using the carrot of 
monetary and nonmonetary rewards rather than the stick of land-use restrictions or 
prosecution for harming a listed species (Shogren 2005).  The logic of the incentive is 
that because the benefits of endangered species protection accrue to the entire nation, the 
burden (i.e., cost) is shifted from the individual landowner to society through a 
government agency or private organization.  Incentives serve to balance power between 
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two actors in such a way that interactions between the two are more collaborative than 
coercive.   
OBJECTIVES 
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the role incentives can play in 
endangered species recovery on private lands.  Specifically, I investigate landowner 
willingness to enroll in a compensation program that protects and maintains endangered 
species habitat on a portion of a landowner’s land.  First, using the theory of reasoned 
action (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980) I predict landowner intentions to enroll in a currently 
existing program (see Wilkins 2004) using attitudes, norms, and background 
characteristics of landowners.  Second, using random utility theory, I examine 
landowner preferences for the structure of performance contracts that vary the levels of 
financial incentives, technical assistance, assurances, contract lengths, and expected 
outcomes.  The first approach focuses on landowner-related factors that influence the 
decision to enroll in a particular program.  The second approach examines how program 
structure itself affects decisions to enroll. 
DEFINITIONS 
The following are the definitions of terms used in this study: 
Compensation Program:  a voluntary program in which enrolled landowners 
receive monetary and/or nonmonetary compensation to offset the opportunity costs 
associated with managing land to provide a net benefit endangered species. 
Incentive: “any inducement specifically intended to motivate private landowners 
to conserve endangered species on their property” (Hadlock and Beckwith 2002, p. 200) 
Incentive Program:  see compensation program. 
Landowner: For the purpose of this research, a landowner is private citizen, 
corporation, or company that has some degree of ownership interest in a parcel of land. 
Part-Worth Utility: the proportion of utility that can be attributed to a specific 
attribute (Hensher et al. 2005, p. 703). 
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Performance Contract: a legal instrument in which an enrolled landowner 
receives full benefits from the compensation program once the criteria of the program 
(e.g., land management objectives) are fully completed  
Utility: a relative measure of satisfaction or happiness that an alternative yields to 
an individual (Hensher et al. 2005, p. 707). 
Working lands: non-urban land in which an actor with the authority to specify 
resource use designates and/or actively manages that land so that other goals (e.g., 
economic) are prioritized over ecological goals (including but not limited to ecosystem 
function, ecosystem services, biodiversity protection).  An actor can refer to either an 
individual (e.g., a single landowner) or corporate groups that act as a single unit (e.g., the 
U.S. Forest Service). 
BACKGROUND 
With a downward trend in land conversion to grazing lands and an upward trend 
in conversion to urban areas (Lubowski et al. 2006), the importance of conservation on 
working lands increasingly has been recognized as integral to stemming biodiversity loss 
(Rosenzweig 2003; Tscharntke et al. 2005; Firbank 2005; Pimentel and Stachow 1992).  
Working lands are non-urban lands in which an actor with the authority to specify 
resource use designates and/or actively manages that land so that other goals (e.g., 
economic) are prioritized over ecological goals.  They make up much of the 90 to 95% 
of the earth's land surface not in reserves.  An actor can refer to either an individual or to 
corporate groups that act as a single unit; thus, working lands can be publicly or 
privately owned.  With its mandate to provide multiple uses of forest lands, the U.S. 
Forest Service is an example of a federal agency that actively manages a working 
landscape.  Private working lands are managed by companies, corporations, and private 
citizens (GAO 1995).   
In this dissertation, I focus on two specific types of working lands: military lands 
and private lands.  Military lands represent only 3 to 4% of all federal lands yet they 
harbor over three times the number of listed, candidate, or proposed species under the 
ESA than any other federal agency (Stein et al. 2008).  As a federal agency the military 
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must comply with environmental laws and regulations such as the Endangered Species 
Act.  The army, for example, actively promotes the recovery of 188 listed species as well 
as others that are imperiled (Queen 2006).   
Overall, the military, and specifically the army, has taken its role in endangered 
species recovery seriously but considers endangered species an encroachment issue, one 
which impedes its ability to carry out its mission to train troops for the provision of 
national defense.  The military currently is looking to other members of the working 
landscape to offset some of this conservation burden. 
By engaging private landowners proximate to military lands, the military can 
reduce restrictions on training, for example, and enhance endangered species recovery 
by protecting more habitat across a wider geographic range.  The primary obstacle to 
obtaining private landowner cooperation is the perverse incentive structure created by 
the historical implementation of the ESA.  Incentive programs increasingly have been 
advocated and implemented as a means to rearrange the incentive structure so that 
landowners are more likely to cooperate with recovery efforts by engaging in some form 
of beneficial land management. 
My research is based on a pilot project in central Texas that engages private 
landowners in endangered species habitat management and protection in order to offset 
some training activities of the local army installation. The Fort Hood Military 
Reservation encompasses approximately 87,890 ha (217, 180 ac) in Bell and Coryell 
Counties in Texas.  Currently, Fort Hood provides infrastructure and training lands for 
over 40,000 uniformed troops.  Training includes brigade-level maneuver exercises live 
weapons firing, and aviation training.  At the same time, almost one third (32%) of the 
military reservation provides suitable habitat for two federally listed endangered 
songbirds.  The black-capped vireo (Vireo atricapilla) was listed by the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service in 1987.  Although its habitat is quite variable it can be characterized as 
early successional habitat consisting of a patchy distribution of broadleaf shrubs within a 
matrix of grasses.  The golden-cheeked warbler (Dendroica chrysoparia) nests in mature 
juniper-oak woodlands often found in relatively moist areas including steep slopes and 
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canyons.  Although exact composition may vary, Ashe juniper (Juniperus ashei) is 
necessary for nest construction.  As Pekins (2006) notes, these species share habitat in 
different successional stages.  Roughly speaking, warbler habitat can revert to vireo 
habitat if degraded, and if vireo habitat is left alone it can transform into warbler habitat.  
Currently, 6,967 ha (17,216 ac) of the military reservation is considered suitable habitat 
for the black-capped vireo and 21,422 ha (52,935 ac) is considered suitable for the 
golden-cheeked warbler. 
In 2005, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service rendered a new biological opinion 
which reduced the designated core habitat for each of the two songbirds.  In order to 
prevent a net loss of species recovery as a result of this action, Fort Hood engaged 
surrounding landowners in long-term conservation easements and programs such as Safe 
Harbor (see Rappaport Clark and Dalton 1999) as well as shorter-term programs.  One 
short-term program, the Leon River Restoration Project, was a cost-share program 
focusing on rangeland restoration and management in central Texas (Wilkins 2004).  
Because the management techniques employed in this project benefited the black-capped 
vireo and the golden-cheeked warbler, it was reconceived as a proof-of-concept project 
for the newly introduced recovery credit system (RCS) (Hall 2008).  Recovery crediting 
is a new tool within the habitat credit trading framework that includes conservation 
banking.  The RCS currently is authorized only to work between the federal government, 
who purchases credits, and private landowners who provide habitat.  Unlike 
conservation banking, credits can be secured by a term contract but only if the negative 
impacts to be offset are temporary themselves.  The RCS provides a recovery tool that, 
like Safe Harbor, contains a “net benefit” provision requiring credits be used to enhance 
a species current status.  One added benefit of this system is that it can incorporate more 
of the working landscape in recovery efforts.  Some landowners may be willing to 
contribute to endangered species recovery but not on a permanent basis.  Additionally, 
the RCS has the potential to include critical habitat across a wider geographic area than a 
conservation bank. 
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As a result of these efforts, the Department of Defense and the Fort Hood 
military installation were interested in understanding the willingness of landowners to 
participate in both long-term and short-term projects.  This information is critical to the 
success of the program and also helps to create a strategy to solicit landowner 
participation. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
My research seeks to understand factors that influence choices to enroll in a 
compensation program for endangered species; however, I was not able to observe actual 
behavior.  Consequently, my research relies on stated preferences for programs.  Both 
approaches I use are members of the family rational choice theories.  Rational choice 
means that individuals are behaving in an optimal fashion, in a manner where they “can 
be deemed to be doing the best they can for themselves, given their objectives, 
resources, and circumstances, as they see them” (Abell 2000, p. 223).   Ben-Akiva and 
Lerman (1985, p. 38) define rational behavior as “a consistent and calculated decision 
process in which the individual follows his or her own objectives, whatever they may 
be.”  There are many critiques of this approach to understanding behavior but these 
models do have predictive validity.  Abell even argues that rational choice approaches to 
behavior are the “least bad” (p. 224) for understanding some types of human behavior.   
I use two different rational choice modeling techniques to approach the question 
of landowner participation in conservation programs.  Approaches that assume rational 
behavior are useful when the behavior of interest is voluntary, when the decision to act 
lends itself to deliberation, and when the behavior is easily performed.  These same 
conditions were met for my research in which landowners were presented an option to 
enroll in a voluntary program to protect and maintain endangered species habitat.  
Although I did not observe actual behavior, behavioral intentions (Ajzen and Fishbein 
2005) and stated preference choice models (Adamowicz et al. 1997; Earnhart 2001) tend 
to be a good predictor of actual behavior under these same conditions. 
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Theory of Reasoned Action 
The theory of reasoned action (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980) is what Timmermans 
(1984) calls a compositional approach to stated preference evaluation in which an 
overall utility value for a behavioral object is calculated.  The reasoned action approach 
to understanding and predicting behavior assumes individuals deliberately process 
information, weigh the positive and negative arguments of engaging in a particular 
behavior, and then incorporate this information in their decision to act.  It assumes that 
this decision to act, the behavioral intention, is the direct antecedent to actual behavior 
(Fishbein and Ajzen 1975).  The behavioral intention is described by Eagly and Chaiken 
(1993, 168) as a "person's motivation in the sense of his or her conscious plan to exert 
effort to carry out a behavior."  There are two distinct determinants of a behavioral 
intention.  The normative component is the social pressure an individual feels from 
salient referent groups to engage (or not engage) in a behavior.  Normative beliefs about 
what specific referent groups (e.g., family) believe an individual should do lead to an 
overall evaluation of social pressure to act.  The utilitarian component (Eagly and 
Chaiken 1993) involves the positive and negative outcomes the individual believes will 
occur as a result of engaging in a behavior.  These behavioral beliefs provide a cognitive 
foundation from which the formation of an attitude toward the behavior occurs.  This 
attitude is an overall positive or negative evaluation of executing the behavior of interest. 
Because behavioral intention is posited to predict behavior, the TRA is limited to 
voluntary behaviors (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980; Eagly and Chaiken 1993).  In response to 
criticisms that some behaviors are not simple, easily performed, or completely under 
volitional control, Ajzen (1991) introduced the theory of planned behavior which added 
perceived behavioral control as a third distinct determinant of behavioral intention.  
Perceived behavioral control is a combined measure of self-efficacy, an individual's 
perception about how easy or difficult it is to engage in a behavior, and beliefs about the 
extent to which performing the behavior is up to the individual (Ajzen 2002).  
The TRA has been used in a wide variety of fields (see Ajzen and Fishbein 2005; 
Eagly and Chaiken 1993) including natural resource management.  For example, the 
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TRA has been used to understand support for policies such as the National Park 
Service’s controlled burn policy (Bright et al. 1993) as well as policy initiatives related 
to trapping (Manfredo et al. 1997) and wildland preservation voting intentions (Vaske 
and Donnelly 1999).  Some work has been conducted on proenvironmental behavior 
such as water conservation (e.g., Trumbo and O'Keefe 2005) and recycling behavior 
(Jones 1990).   
Random Utility Theory 
Random utility theory also operates under the assumption of rational behavior.  It 
assumes that individuals faced with a choice between multi-attribute goods will choose 
an alternative that provides them with the greatest utility (i.e., satisfaction) (McFadden 
1974).  For example, when presented with two different incentive program contracts, the 
choice modeling technique assumes that a private landowner will choose the one that 
makes him or her the happiest.  While the landowner considers all personally-relevant 
factors during the decision-making process a researcher cannot account for all of these 
factors involved.  Consequently, choice models are probabilistic, decomposing the utility 
(Uj) of enrolling in a particular incentive program into what a researcher can observe (Vj) 
for a set of program attributes (A) as well as other unobserved factors (εj).  This random 
utility model is formally represented as: 
Uj = Vj(A) + εj 
As Manski (1977) notes, utilities are treated as random variables not because the 
individual is not acting rationally, but because of the failure of the researcher to account 
for all characteristics of the alternatives in the model.   
This approach has been applied to a number of different nonmarket goods 
(Adamowicz et al. 1998) to understand preferences for and potential behavioral 
responses environmental issues and policy changes including ecotourism (Hearne and 
Salinas 2002), environmental risk (Casey et al. 2008; Travisi and Nijkamp 2008), 
wetland mitigation (Bauer et al. 2004), forest management (Boxall and Macnab 2000), 
and outdoor recreation (Bullock and Lawson 2008; Hunt et al. 2005; Sorice et al. 2007). 
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Situating Compensation Programs in a Social Dilemma Framework 
A social dilemma encompasses a class of situations in which an individual’s 
short-term self interest competes with the long-term interest of a group.  In terms of this 
research, the short-term self interest is land conversion for agriculture while the long-
term group interest is maintaining or restoring habitat to protect endangered species (i.e., 
maintaining biodiversity) in order to support ecosystem function and services that 
enhance human well-being. 
Endangered species recovery often is not situated in a social dilemma 
framework.  As a result, it can be relatively easy to overlook the perverse incentive 
structure created by the historical implementation of the ESA.  Some scholars critique 
incentive programs as rewarding landowners for engaging in behaviors they should be 
engaging in anyway (e.g., Raymond and Olive 2008).  Under a social dilemma 
framework, however, compensation programs are not considered rewards.  Instead, they 
are a way of rearranging a perverse incentive structure so that endangered species 
recovery occurs at a more optimal level. 
Using random utility theory as a behavioral model, I investigate ways to 
rearrange the incentive structure that will increase landowner cooperation with 
endangered species protection on private lands.  Specifically, I examine four factors that 
make up a compensation program (financial incentives, technical assistance, contract 
length, and assurances against future regulation) as well as two expected outcomes of 
enrolling (improving your own land and help the endangered species).  Instead of asking 
landowners to indicate preferences for individual factors, I combined all factors into 
hypothetical performance contract profiles.  Landowners then evaluate a series of 
contract profiles and choose the ones in which they would enroll. 
PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
Research on incentive programs tends to be atheoretical and almost exclusively 
focuses on explaining or predicting landowner participation.  A number of variables 
have been identified as salient to participation.  For example, Kraft, Lant & Gillman 
(1996) asked farmers in four states about their willingness to participate in the Water 
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Quality Incentive Program.  Under the program, farmers developed water quality 
protection programs in return for a per-acre incentive of up to $3,500 per year for a three 
to five year period.  Using a discrete choice framework, the authors found an increased 
probability of participation by farmers who owned their land (rather than leasing), who 
were more educated, had more positive attitudes toward government involvement in 
wetland regulations, had worked with a National Resource Conservation Service 
(NRCS) representative in the past year, and who had a higher percentage of their gross 
farm sales from specialty crops. 
Nagubadi, McNamara, Hoover & Mills (1996) also used a discrete choice 
framework to examine factors influencing Indiana non-industrial private forest (NIPF) 
landowners participation in two forestry incentive programs.  In the first program, the 
assessed value of an enrolled owner’s land is reduced to $1 per acre and free technical 
assistance was provided by the state’s natural resources department.  For this program, 
landowner age and total acres owned were significantly and positively related to 
program participation.  NIPF owners possessing land primarily for commercial use had a 
20% higher probability of participating.  Owners using consulting 
foresters/biologists/soil conservation agents were more likely to participate as well as 
those belonging to forestry organizations.  Landowners who feared a loss of property 
rights or management options were less likely to participate in this program (p-value < 
0.10).  Finally, the number of years since landowners acquired their first acre of wooded 
land was negatively related (with p-value < 0.10) to participation.  This was an 
unexpected result and the authors posit that it may reflect the difference between recent 
and early land purchasers or that the timber may have already been cut, providing no 
substantial benefits. 
The second program investigated by Nagubadi, McNamara, Hoover & Mills 
(1996) was a cost-share program.  For this model, landowners possessing land primarily 
for commercial use was the only variable significantly (and positively) related to 
participation.  On-site residence, membership in forestry organizations, and an attitude 
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variable regarding willingness to sell an easement on their woodland were positively 
related to cost-share program participation at p = 0.10. 
Research conducted on incentive programs for protecting endangered species on 
private land is more salient to off-site conservation of endangered species.  Kline et al. 
(2000), for example, examined the willingness of private forest landowners to adopt 
harvest restrictions to protect or enhance riparian habitat in return for federal income tax 
deduction.  They found that many private forest landowners were motivated to operate 
their land for reasons other than timber production.  Specifically, the more a private 
forest owner depends on the land for timber sales the less willing they are to participate.  
This finding was fairly consistent across income categories.  Landowners who depend on 
their land for income require a higher economic incentive than landowners who operate 
their land either for recreational or mixed objectives.  Although the paper was framed as 
benefiting coho salmon restoration, it is unclear whether the researchers actually framed 
the purpose of the no-harvest buffer around riparian areas as a program for the benefit of 
endangered species or for the general ecosystem in the survey instrument. 
Langpap (2004) examined the demographic and land characteristics influencing 
participation in incentive programs designed to provide habitat for endangered species in 
western Oregon and Washington.  The likelihood of participation was positively related 
to the importance a landowner places on the wildlife habitat provided by the forest, the 
number of acres owned, and membership in conservation organizations.  Participation 
was negatively correlated with the landowner’s age.   Marginal findings included a 
negative likelihood of participation related to years of ownership, total acreage owned, 
and the important of aesthetic enjoyment of the forest.  No statistically significant 
relationship was found with the importance of investment or the commercial value of the 
forest.  A useful finding here is that the landowner’s perceived risk of regulation under 
the Endangered Species Act did not have statistically significant influence on the 
probability of participation; 60% of the respondents felt that the chance that activity on 
their property would be restricted by the ESA was less than half.  From this Langpap 
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concludes that landowners who are more likely to participate in the program may not 
focus as much on managing their land for profit. 
Langpap (2006) then considered the effects of program structure on participation 
by examining the effects of assurances, cost sharing, incentive payments, and technical 
assistance on the probability that private landowners would engage in increasing levels 
of effort to manage their land for endangered species.  Cost sharing provided a weak 
incentive while assurances provided the strongest incentive.  Combining financial 
incentives with assurances, however, markedly increased a landowner’s potential effort 
to manage their land for endangered species.  Technical assistance did not provide any 
substantive incentive.  Finally, in this study, demographic variables, property size, and 
residence were not related to participation or efforts. 
Research on non-industrial private forest (NIPF) landowners in North Carolina 
focused on incentives to protect the red-cockaded woodpecker (RCW), a federally 
endangered species.  Zhang & Mehmood (2002) and Mehmood & Zhang (2005) looked 
at determinants of participation in the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s Safe Harbor 
Program for the RCW.  Using logistic regression to explain participation, Mehmood & 
Zhang (2005) found the following variables to be significant and positively related to 
participation: 
• Acreage, 
• The possible presence of RCWs (measured by presence of active nests within 
one mile of a landowner’s land and the amount of mature pine), 
• The use of burning, chemical, and/or mechanical methods of understory control, 
• Landowner perceptions of the degree of risk of RCWs relocating onto their land 
(p < 0.10), 
• Landowner attitudes toward RCW and endangered species protection, and 
• Whether a landowner was introduced to Safe Harbor by a consulting forester 
Only one variable, looking at whether landowners believe the Safe Harbor 
program would weaken their property rights, was significant and negatively related to 
participation. 
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The positive coefficients for the possible presence of RCWs and perceived 
degree of risk were explained as landowners wanting to enroll now to protect their 
investments and remove future uncertainties.  Thus, the higher the risk, the more likely a 
landowner is to enroll.  Furthermore, the higher the perception that property rights would 
be taken away, the less likely a landowner was to enroll.   
 
 
 
Table 1. Qualitative differences in landowner characteristics of central Texas ranchers based on Cearley-
Sanders (2005). 
Item 
Born to the 
Land (BTL) 
Agricultural 
Business Reborn to the Land
Age Oldest Slightly younger than BTL Youngest 
Ranching Experience Most Middle Least 
Land size Medium to Large Large Small 
Land tenure Long Short Short 
Percent income from 
ranching High High Low 
Level of connection to 
land High (spiritual) 
Low (Profit 
oriented) 
High (aesthetic and 
recreational) 
Sense of stewardship Strong ? Strong 
Attitude toward 
government assistance Negative Negative Neutral 
Receive government 
assistance Yes No No 
Interaction with 
federal/state/ local 
agencies 
Likely Unlikely Somewhat Likely 
 
 
Finally, Cearly-Sanders (2005) used a qualitative approach to explore the 
relationship between characteristics of central Texas landowners and their willingness to 
participate in incentive programs to enhance endangered species habitat.  Of the 56 
responses, 11% indicated no willingness to participate, 59% initially indicated no 
willingness but then said they would if certain conditions were met, 13% initially 
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indicated a willingness conditional on having their concerns met, and 18% indicated a 
willingness to participate.  Due to a lack of a random sample of landowners, however, 
her results are not generalizable beyond her sample.  However, they are useful in this 
research because they used landowners from central Texas and ask about endangered 
species protection.  Additionally, Cearley-Sanders couched their willingness to 
participate within three types of landowners: Born to the Land, Agricultural Business, 
and Reborn to the Land (Table 1).  She suggests that Reborn to the Land landowners 
were the most likely to enroll in an incentive program while Agricultural Business 
landowners were least likely to enroll. 
PURPOSE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION 
My dissertation begins with two stand-alone papers that explore the intentions of 
landowners in central Texas to enroll in a performance contract based on the initial Leon 
River Restoration Project and the current recovery credit system.  As much of the 
literature relates socio-demographic variables to landowner participation in 
compensation programs, I begin the first paper with an empirical exploration of the role 
of landowner and land-use characteristics in predicting participation in the endangered 
species program.  These items to not perform well in predicting landowner intentions to 
enroll.  I then add landowners’ perceived outcomes of enrolling, interest in participating 
in other programs, and past participation in programs to identify useful predictors of 
landowner enrollment.  Coupling the land management benefits of the species and the 
landowner enhances participation while landowner beliefs that they won’t be able to 
make their own land-use decisions decrease participation.  This exploratory study 
suggests that finding potential participants largely is a matter of finding landowners who 
desire the same land management benefits.  For example, landowners who have restored 
their rangeland in the past five years were much more likely to participate than those that 
have not. 
With confirmation that landowner characteristics cannot be used as an effective 
proxy for understanding participation in compensation programs, I apply the theory of 
reasoned action to the same endangered species program as in the first paper.  The 
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results of this analysis show that landowner attitudes toward enrolling contribute the 
most to the predictive ability of the reasoned action model.  Subjective norm, the 
perceived social pressure to enroll, was not statistically significant but further analysis 
reveals that it remains an essential component in the model.  Other behavioral predictors 
are useful to help identify potential participants, but they only make small contributions 
to prediction. 
The first two papers look at landowner characteristics and social variables related 
to enrollment in a particular program with a fixed structure.  I also was interested in 
understanding how the program structure itself influences participation.  My third paper 
presents results from a choice experiment in which landowners decided between 
performance contracts that varied by the types and levels of incentives offered.  I found 
two distinct landowner groups with varying preferences for performance contracts.  This 
heterogeneity in landowner preferences has implications for optimizing conservation 
through landowner recruitment and the design of compensation programs. 
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CHAPTER II 
RECOVERY OF ENDANGERED SPECIES ON PRIVATE LANDS: 
PROSPECTS FOR INCENTIVE PROGRAMS 
INTRODUCTION 
As a consequence of the implementation of some provisions of the Endangered 
Species Act (ESA), many private landowners intentionally do not engage in land 
management behaviors that benefit endangered species and some refuse to cooperate in 
recovery efforts at all (Bean 1998). Private property rights sometimes are invoked to 
refuse government access to potential habitat and populations. Refusing access not only 
impedes species conservation directly but also information collection which is useful in 
determining a species’ status and level of recovery (Brook et al. 2003; Polasky and 
Doremus 1998). In many cases, the implementation of the ESA actually has created 
perverse incentives in which, rather than cooperate, landowners engage in preemptive 
habitat destruction to prevent use by an endangered species (e.g., Lueck and Michael 
2003).   
There have been many suggestions made about how to correct the equity, 
fairness, and trust issues that ultimately lead private landowners to choose not to 
cooperate in endangered species recovery (Hadlock and Beckwith 2002). For example, 
Brook et al. (2003) recommend using social networks to communicate information and 
increasing the use of collaborative processes.  Pointing to successful agricultural 
incentive programs such as the Conservation Reserve Program (16 USC ss 3831 et seq), 
Bean (1998,:10707) takes a strong stance on this issue by saying that "without positive 
incentives, the Act's goals are unlikely to be achieved." Thompson Jr. (2006) agrees with 
Bean and adds that a focus on reserves to the exclusion of the surrounding working 
landscape (i.e., farms and ranches) increases the chances that recovery efforts will 
ultimately fail. An incentive, as discussed in Hadlock and Beckwith (2002, 200), is "any 
inducement specifically intended to motivate private landowners to conserve endangered 
species on their property."  Incentives may be monetary or nonmonetary.  Monetary 
incentives can include direct financial assistance in the form of subsidies (e.g., 
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Conservation Reserve Program) or conservation easements; market-based methods such 
as mitigation banking or tradable credits; or, incentives based on tax 
reform.  Nonmonetary incentives focus on reducing uncertainty, increasing nonmonetary 
benefits to the landowner, and balancing power between the landowner and the 
administering agency (by creating opportunities for collaboration rather than relying on 
coercion).  Many conservation programs have since emerged that provide monetary and 
nonmonetary incentives for landowners to protect endangered species habitat on their 
land (e.g., Ginn 2005, Chapter 9). 
Recovery efforts are likely to fail without incentives to encourage beneficial land 
management (Bean 1998; Thompson Jr. 2006).  A current understanding of landowners, 
their orientation toward endangered species and incentives programs, and their 
willingness to participate in these programs is important for successful endangered 
species recovery.  I examined the intentions of landowners to enroll in a cost-share 
program to protect and maintain endangered species habitat in central Texas.  
Specifically, the objectives of this study were to: 1) examine the relationship between 
landowner characteristics and potential enrollment, and 2) examine the role of beliefs 
about the consequences of enrolling as well as past behavior as factors related to 
decision making among landowners. 
Previous Research 
Past research on the adoption of conservation practices and enrollment in 
conservation programs that provide incentives to engage in beneficial land management 
practices has examined landowner and land use characteristics.  For example, studies 
have focused on factors influencing the adoption of conservation practices (e.g., 
Korsching and Hoban 1990) as well as interest in participating in conservation programs 
to prevent soil erosion (see, Lockeretz 1990), improve water quality (Kraft et al. 1996; 
Thurow et al. 2001), improve range productivity (Kreuter et al. 2005), and enhance or 
maintain wildlife habitat (Olenick et al. 2004). 
While the results aren’t entirely consistent, the current understanding is that 
younger, more educated, and higher income landowners are more pro-environment (e.g., 
19 
 
Jones and Dunlap 1992), less likely to exhibit strong property rights orientations 
(Jackson-Smith et al. 2005), or antipathy for endangered species (Kellert 1996).  Thus, 
one might expect that younger, more educated, and higher income landowners will be 
more likely to participate in a cost-share conservation program.   
Additional work on rural landowners suggests that different types of landowners 
may be more willing to participate in cost-share programs (Cearly-Sanders 2005; 
Raedeke et al. 2001; Kline et al. 2000).  Landowners who are absentee, manage fewer 
acres, have not been in the community for long, and who operate their land mostly for 
enjoyment rather than income are expected to be more likely to cooperate in cost-share 
programs.  Reading et al. (1994) found that landowners who had not been in the 
community for long were more supportive of ecosystem management.  Cearly-Sanders 
(2005) found that this general type of landowner was more amenable to an endangered 
species cost-share program in central Texas.   
Landowners who rely on their land to provide income for their families are likely 
to view cost-share programs differently than landowners using their land for recreation, 
an investment, or as a hobby ranch.  Olenick et al. (2005), for example, found that 
potential participants in land management programs to enhance ecosystem services 
derived a greater proportion of their income from their land than potential non-
participants (also see, Kreuter et al. 2004).  Studies where endangered species are 
involved suggest the opposite.  Brook et al. (2003) found that the more economically 
dependent landowners were on agriculture, the more they disagreed that landowners 
should be responsible for species conservation; and, they were more likely to manage 
their land to decrease the chance of endangered species occupying it.  Kline et al. (2000) 
found that the more a private forest owner depended on the land for timber sales the less 
willing they were to adopt harvest restrictions in exchange for a federal income tax 
deduction.  Cearly-Sanders (2005) concluded that dependence on land was a 
discriminating factor in a landowner’s interest to enroll in a program for endangered 
species.  Larger landholders were less likely to be interested. 
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Dependence on land is usually considered a landowner characteristic alongside 
other socio-demographic items.  Here, I explore the usefulness of income dependence as 
a proxy for other landowner characteristics such as absentee landownership, property 
size and other.  I hypothesize that landowner characteristics are related to dependence on 
the land for income but not to enrollment in cost-share programs.  I expect that 
landowners who are absentee, manage less acres, have not been in the community for a 
long time, and who manage their land for enjoyment will be less dependent on their land 
for income.  Furthermore, I expect landowners who are less dependent on their land to 
be more willing to enroll in a cost-share program for endangered species. 
Some authors (e.g., Lockeretz 1990) have criticized studies that relate landowner 
characteristics to conservation behaviors.  Although landowner characteristics may be 
related to behavior, they generally do not perform well in predicting specific behaviors 
(Ajzen and Fishbein 1980).  Short of observing actual behavior, the best predictors of 
behavior are other behavioral items.  For example, Eagly and Chaiken (1993) discuss the 
importance of past behavior on predicting future behavior.  Additionally, behavioral 
intentions are deliberate plans to act that are created just before an action occurs and can 
be useful in predicting behavior.  Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) conceptualize the 
behavioral intention as the immediate antecedent of behavior.  Behavioral intentions 
tend to be good predictors of actual behavior when the behavior of interest is voluntary, 
the individual deliberately weighs the positive and negative outcomes of engaging in the 
behavior, and when the behavior is easily performed (see McCleery et al. 2006 for a 
review).  I expect that behavioral intentions related to the behavior of interest should 
improve prediction because the program is voluntary, it lends itself to deliberation, and it 
is not difficult to enroll in a program. 
METHODS 
The population of interest in this study was landowners around the Fort Hood 
military installation who have potential habitat for two endangered songbirds, the 
endangered black-capped vireo (Vireo atricapilla) and the golden-cheeked warbler 
(Dendroica chrysoparia).  The black-capped vireo is a small songbird that breeds locally 
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in central Texas and winters in Mexico.  Vireo habitat can become unsuitable due to 
improper brush clearing, fire suppression, overbrowsing, and urbanization (Texas Parks 
and Wildlife Department 2004a).  Habitat can be improved as the result of active land 
management that restores rangeland by selectively clearing Ashe juniper (Juniperus 
ashei) and regenerating rangeland grasses using prescribed burning (Texas Parks and 
Wildlife Department 2004b).  The golden-cheeked warbler is a habitat specialist that 
primarily breeds in mixed hardwood forests in central Texas containing mature juniper 
trees and nests predominantly in stands occurring on steep slopes and in canyons (Ladd 
and Gass 1999).  Fort Hood is the largest block of a relatively small amount of federal 
land in the breeding range of the species.  As such, it is considered a key area for the 
management of the species.  However, due to the predominance of private lands in the 
species breeding range, recovery will occur only with the cooperation of private 
landowners  To maintain consistency with previous research (i.e., Wilkins 2004), this 
study sampled from the population of landowners in the Leon, Bosque, and Lampasas 
watersheds in all or part of six counties surrounding Ft. Hood including: Bell, Bosque, 
Coryell, Hamilton, Lampasas, and McLennan County in central Texas (Figure 1).   
Sampling 
A sampling frame was constructed by identifying landowners with at least 10 
hectares and a moderate to high potential for having golden-cheeked warbler habitat on 
their property.  The 10-hectare requirement for inclusion in this study was derived from 
two factors.  First, literature on golden-cheeked warbler habitat requirements indicates 
that golden-cheeked warblers may have territory densities as small as 4 hectares (Anders 
and Dearborn 2004; Ladd and Gass 1999; Peak 2004); although, they may require larger 
patches of habitat in which to breed (Arnold et al. 1996; Coldren 1998; Magness et al. 
2006).  Second, current ownership trends in central and east Texas are toward smaller 
properties.  Wilkins, Hays, Kubenka et al. (2003) classified current landownership in 
Texas based on three size classes: 41 to 202 hectares (100 to 500 acres), 202 to 809 
hectares (500 to 2000 acres), and greater than 809 hectares (2000 acres).  I did not bind 
the study frame by the habitat constraints of the golden-cheeked warbler because 
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program administrators can aggregate smaller land parcels held by landowners with less 
than 41 hectares into larger conservation units.  Additionally, because golden-cheeked 
warblers inhabit areas that are increasingly fragmenting and/or urbanizing, it is of 
interest to survey landowners with less than 41 hectares.  Ten hectares was ultimately 
chosen as the lower bound because, ignoring issues regarding minimum habitat patch 
size, it is sizeable enough to accommodate a breeding pair and it is of interest given 
current demographic trends in land ownership.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Location of study area. Research area included landowners in six counties around the Ft. Hood 
army installation within one of three watersheds. 
 
 
I obtained landowner information from each county’s tax appraisal district.  
Because I was interested in landowners with potential habitat, a golden-cheeked warbler 
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habitat model, created by Jones (2006), was overlaid on tax appraisal data using GIS.  I 
selected landowners with a moderate to high probability of having golden-cheeked 
warbler habitat.  Finally, I submitted the landowner information to a consumer 
information company to obtain phone numbers. 
I stratified the sample by county simply to facilitate data collection and treated 
the results as a random sample.  Because endangered species issues are not salient for 
most landowners (e.g., Raymond and Olive 2008), I was concerned about the response 
rate and utilized the following four steps in the research protocol.  First, I sent a letter to 
a subset of landowner mailing addresses advising them that I would be calling regarding 
a project on wildlife conservation and then called about one week later.  For landowners 
who agreed to participate, the first author and two other interviewers trained by the first 
author conducted a face-to-face structured interview focusing on land-use and landowner 
characteristics.  At the end of the 15-minute interview, the interviewer left a self-
administered questionnaire containing the conservation program items with the 
participant along with a small watercolor print of a local landscape as a thank-you gift.  
To ensure a suitable response rate for the self-administered questionnaire I used a rolling 
reminder procedure adapted from the Dillman (2000) mail survey technique.  One week 
after each round of interviews, I sent a thank you/reminder postcard followed 3 weeks 
and 7 weeks later by a reminder letter and replacement questionnaire.  Interviewing 
began in April 2007 and ended in November, 2007.  This research was approved by 
Texas A&M University’s Office of Research Compliance (Protocol #2006-0011). 
Measuring Behavioral Intentions, Landowner Characteristics, and Dependence 
The dependent variable was a behavioral intention to enroll in a cost-share 
program to protect and maintain endangered species habitat.  It was modeled on the 
Leon River Restoration Project (LRRP), a local cost-share program focusing on juniper 
removal to improve water flow, water quality, reduce fire potential and improve 
grassland wildlife habitat.  This program has since evolved into a proof-of-concept pilot 
project for a new conservation tool, the recovery credit system (RCS) (Hall 2008), which 
focuses on improving endangered species recovery.  For this study, I retained the same 
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program structure of the original LRRP but reframed it in terms of a cost-share program 
targeting habitat for two endangered bird species.  The two bird species involved are the 
black-capped vireo and golden-cheeked warbler, but I did not specifically mention them.  
I was interested in the idea of an endangered species program and did not want the actual 
species to confound decision making.  It certainly was possible, however, for landowners 
in the area to deduce the species involved.  In addition, although it is a well-regarded, 
successful program, I did not label the program because I wanted landowners to 
concentrate on the attributes of the project.  Again, it was possible for landowners to 
deduce that I was asking about the LRRP.  Landowners were provided with the 
following description of the program: 
This program is run by a local non-profit group in central Texas. 
Landowners volunteer for the program and enroll in a 5-year performance 
contract to manage their land for two species of endangered birds. It 
provides 85% cost sharing to landowners to clear Ashe juniper, also 
called cedar, and to conduct a prescribed/controlled burn on a portion of 
their land.  The contract also includes preserving some areas of mature 
oak-juniper woodlands on steep slopes and in canyons. The program 
provides assistance with the management plan and conducts the brush 
clearing and burn for the landowner. The benefits of this program include 
improved grazing capacity, ground & surface water conservation, and 
enhanced wildlife habitat. After the contract expires and the performance 
criteria are met, the landowners are reimbursed the remaining 15% of the 
costs (minus the costs for the prescribed burn) and are free to operate the 
land in whatever way they desire. 
Landowners were then asked how likely or unlikely they were to enroll in this program 
using a 7-point scale from 1 = “Extremely Unlikely” and 7 = “Extremely Likely.”   
Landowner demographics considered in this study were age, education (1 = 
“Two-Year Degree or Less,” 2 = “Some College,” 3 = “College Degree,” and 4 = “At 
Least Some Graduate or Professional School”).  Annual household income for the year 
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2006 was coded as 1 = “Less than $60,000,” 2 = “$60,000 to $119,999,” and 3 = 
“$120,000 or More.” Two dummy variables were created for absentee landowners.  A 
landowner was considered absentee if they did not live on their land and if they 
considered their land to be in a different community from which they resided.  A partial 
absentee landowner did not live on their property but considered their land to be in the 
same community. 
Based on their findings, Raedeke et al. (2001) speculated that a landowner’s 
identity as a rancher or farmer may play a role in decision making.  Using qualitative 
research, Bliss and Martin (1989) found identity to be a central construct in 
understanding management motivations of non-industrial private forest owners.  I 
expected a landowner’s identity as a rancher or farmer to be positively related to their 
dependence on their land for income.  Using a scale where 1 = “Strongly Disagree” and 
7 = “Strongly Agree,” landowners were asked to respond to these three statements: 
“Farming/ranching says a lot about who I am,” “I consider myself a rancher,” and “I 
consider myself a farmer”.  These three items had a high level of reliability (Cronbach’s 
alpha = 0.81) and were averaged together to create the identity variable. 
I also measured a landowner’s rootedness to the community.  Rootedness 
includes the number of years a landowner’s place has been in their family and the extent 
to which the landowner feels a sense of history and a sense of pride about their family’s 
history (Tuan 1980).  (Note that landowners in this area commonly refer to their property 
as their “place.”)  Two items were used to assess this sense of history on the land.  Using 
the same 7-point scale from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree” landowners 
responded to these two statements: “My place represents my family history” and “I am 
proud of my family’s history on this place.”  The number of years the place has been in 
the family was log transformed to reduce skew, the three items were standardized, and 
an additive index was created (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.76).  I also measured the number of 
years the landowner owned his or her place, transformed it to reduce skew, and allowed 
it to covary with rootedness. 
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The single-item variable, “Enjoy” measured whether a landowner operated 
his/her land “purely for the enjoyment of it” using a 7-point scale from “Strongly 
Disagree” to “Strongly Agree.”  Because 42% of landowners strongly agreed with this 
statement, a dummy variable was created where 1 = “Strongly Agree” and 0 = 
“Moderately Agree or Less.” 
The major land characteristic of interest was the number of hectares a landowner 
managed.  “Decision hectares” includes any additional hectares leased in by the 
landowner but removes any hectares leased out.  Decision hectares was highly skewed 
right and was log transformed.   
Many studies operationalize a landowner’s dependence on land for income using 
a fairly objective measure of the percent of annual household income derived from 
activities on a landowner’s property.  In this research I found that this item suffered from 
a relatively high item-nonresponse rate (12%).  My measure of dependence involved 
three items measured on a 7-point scale from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree.”  
The three items, “My place is an important source of income,” “My place is a business,” 
and “My place is a way to financially provide for my family,” were averaged to create a 
composite score (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.89). 
Stewardship was measured using two items.  Using a 7-point scale from 
“Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree” landowners were first asked to respond to a 
general statement, “I have an obligation to maintain my land in good condition for future 
generations.”  They also indicated their agreement for a wildlife-oriented stewardship 
item, “It is my responsibility to take care of all wildlife that use my place.” 
I measured a series of expected outcomes that may influence a landowner’s 
intention to enroll in the program.  They were created based on the results of a focus 
group with landowners in the target study area.  Landowners were asked about potential 
consequences of enrolling using a 7-point scale from 1 = “Extremely Unlikely” to 7 = 
“Extremely Likely.”  Negative outcomes included the potential for future governmental 
regulation of their land, not receiving needed technical assistance, having too much 
paperwork, not receiving adequate financial compensation, constraints on ability to 
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make their own land-use decisions, and losing control over who accesses their land. 
Positive outcomes included improving the land and helping the target endangered 
species. 
Behavioral items included two measures of past behavior and two measures of 
behavioral intentions related to the program.  First, landowners were asked to indicate if 
they had participated in a number of federal (e.g., USDA Conservation Reserve 
Program) or state programs (e.g., state-sponsored private land wildlife management 
programs) within the past 10 years.  A dummy variable called “Past Programs” was 
created to indicate whether a landowner participated in at least one of these programs.  
Because the primary land management practice of the LRRP and the current RCS is 
restoring early successional habitat by clearing juniper, landowners were asked if they 
had cleared juniper on their land within the past 5 years and a dummy variable, “Brush,” 
was created where 1 = “Yes.”  Second, I measured three behavioral intentions relating to 
a landowner’s willingness to enroll in a general cost-share program to “set aside a 
portion of my land as wildlife habitat,” “set aside or restore a portion of my land as 
habitat for an endangered species,” and to “control brush, such as Ashe juniper (cedar), 
on a portion of my land.”  These items were measured using a 7-point scale from 1 = 
“Extremely Unlikely” and 7 = “Extremely Likely.” 
Data Analysis 
To understand factors that may predict enrollment I used logit models for binary 
and ordinal outcomes because the assumptions for OLS regression (i.e., multivariate 
normality and normal distribution of the error term) were not met.  The two dependent 
variables in this study (i.e., dependence on land for income and behavioral intention to 
enroll) represent underlying continuous variables.  For this reason I use a latent variable 
model where y* represents a latent, unobserved variable.  For logistic regression, the 
observed y for an individual, i,  is 1 if yi* > 0 and 0 if  yi* ≤ 0 (Long 1997).   
I regressed dependence on landowner characteristics using an ordinal logit.  
Dependence on land for income was originally scored as the average of 3 items 
measured on a 7-point scale but converted to a 3-level ordinal variable.  Landowners 
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scoring a 1 or 2 (39% of the sample) on the original measure were classified as having 
low dependence, medium dependence was assigned to landowners scoring between 3 
and 5 (39% of the sample), and landowners scoring a 6 or 7 on the scale (23% of the 
sample) were placed in the category of high dependence. 
The 7-point behavioral intention to enroll in the program was recoded into a 
binary variable where 1 = “Likely” and 0 = “Unsure or Unlikely.”  Intention was then 
regressed on landowner characteristics using logistic regression to examine the potential 
for the dependence item to act as a mediator.  Finally, intention was regressed on 
dependence, the 8 belief outcomes, and the 3 behavioral items using a block regression 
format.  The block logistic regression allowed me to observe the change in model fit 
(i.e., pseudo R2) as I controlled for groups of variables.  Odds ratios (eβ) are reported in 
the tables and the percent change in odds ([eβ – 1]*100%) are used to interpret the 
results.  All interpretations of statistically significant variables are given with the 
consideration that all other variables in the model are held constant.  Block regression 
models are compared using likelihood ratio tests and I report the McKelvey and 
Zavoina’s R2, which is calculated based on predicting a continuous latent variable 
underlying the observed outcomes in the data (Long 1997).  Additionally, because of the 
latent variable model, it is appropriate to compare the contribution of each variable to the 
model using fully standardized coefficients as is done in OLS regression (Long 1997). 
Tolerances were used to check for multicollinearity and no problems were found.  
Finally, in this study I set a 90% level of confidence because some of these variables 
have not been previously used to characterize landowners.  Thus, I consider this work 
somewhat exploratory and would like to identify explanatory variables for further 
investigation. 
RESULTS 
I calculated a phone response rate of 45% of 542 landowners using the American 
Association for Public Opinion Research (2006) standards.  Of the 245 self-administered 
questionnaires left with the participants, 214 were returned for a self-administered 
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survey response rate of 87%.  Of these, 202 cases were usable.  Using list-wise deletion 
for all variables, the sample size used for the logistic models was 144. 
Landowner Characteristics 
The average age of landowners in the sample was 64 years (sd = 11).  A majority 
were male (87%), white (97%), and not Spanish/Hispanic (98%).  Nearly two-thirds of 
the sample (63%) had an education level of trade school, an apprenticeship, a 2-year 
degree, or higher.   
The average area owned was 141 hectares (sd = 183 hectares) with a median of 
75 hectares.  A plurality (42%) of landowners owned between 41 and 202 hectares.  On 
average, landowners managed 163 hectares (sd = 360) with a median of 49 hectares.  
About 13% leased out their entire property in the past year resulting in 0 decision 
hectares and 64% managed between 10 and 202 hectares. 
Landowners had owned their land for an average of 21 years (sd = 15 years) and 
19% were absentee landowners who did not live on their land and who considered their 
land to be in a separate community from their residence.  Absentee landowners lived an 
average of 50 (sd = 60) miles from their place.   
Most landowners (53%) operated their land for crops, livestock, or both; and, 
29% incorporated wildlife as part of their primary land management objective.  The 
majority of landowners (83%) had a job that was not directly related to agriculture and 
of these almost one third (32%) were retired.  On average, landowners relied on their 
land for 14% of their annual household income and most (78%) relied on the land for 
15% or less of their annual income. 
Landowners strongly considered themselves to be land stewards.  Most 
landowners (90%) strongly agreed that they have an obligation to maintain land in good 
condition for future generations.  The majority of landowners (68%) also strongly agreed 
with the statement that it is their responsibility to take care of all wildlife that use their 
place.   
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Dependence on Income from Land 
The ordinal logit regressing dependence on land for income on socio-economic 
characteristics was significant (LRχ2 = 91.92, df = 12, p < 0.001) and fit well (R2M&Z = 
0.547; Table 2).  Five variables contributed to the model.  Holding other variables 
constant, landowners with at least some graduate or professional school have odds of 
depending on income from their land that are 63% lower than landowners with a two-
year degree or less.   For every increase in income category, the odds of having greater 
dependence (i.e., being in a higher dependence category) decrease by 38%.  The odds of 
being more dependent on one’s land are 74% lower for landowners who strongly agreed 
that they operate their land for enjoyment compared to landowners who answered 
otherwise.  For every unit increase in the level of rootedness, the odds of increased 
dependence increase by 36%.  For every level increase in a landowner’s identity as a 
rancher, the odds of being dependent on the land for income increase by 65%.  
Comparing fully standardized regression coefficients, identity (β = 0.34) made the most 
important contribution to the model followed by rootedness (β = 0.28), enjoyment (β = -
0.25), graduate or professional school education (β = -0.17), and income (β = -0.14).  
Identity and rootedness were over 1.5 times as important as education and income in 
contributing to the model.  The logistic regression of the program behavioral intention 
on landowner characteristics was not significant (LRχ2 = 16.25, df = 12, p = 0.1801) 
indicating that socio-economic information was not useful in predicting whether a 
landowner was likely to enroll in the program.  
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Table 2. Odd ratios of an ordinal logit regressing perceived dependence on land for income on landowner 
and land-use characteristics. 
Variable Odds Ratio Std. Err. p-value 
Age 1.0120 .0210 0.565
Education  
Two-Year Degree or Less  
Some College .6177 .3417 0.384
College Degree .4629 .2551 0.162
At Least Some Grad/Professional School .3711 .1938 0.058
Income .6242 .1582 0.063
Identity 1.6483 2198 < 0.001
Absentee .7374 .4638 0.628
Partial Absentee .9145 .5789 0.888
Decision Hectares 1.091 .0674 0.160
Years Property Owned .8929 .1282 0.430
Rootedness 1.3591 .1360 0.002
Enjoy .2598 .1044 0.001
Cut point 1 -0.0754  
Cut point 2 2.7644  
N 145  
LL -109.4421  
AIC 246.8841  
R2M&Z 0.547  
 
Intentions to Enroll in Cost-Share Programs 
Landowners generally were split about enrolling in cost-share conservation 
programs.  Slightly more than half (53%) indicated that they would enroll in a program 
to set aside a portion of their land as wildlife habitat.  Less than half (40%) indicated an 
intention to enroll in a general program to set aside or restore a portion of their land as 
habitat for an endangered species.  This increased to 50% for the endangered species 
program. 
Although significant at the 90% confidence level, dependence, by itself, was not 
particularly useful in predicting intentions to enroll (LRχ2 = 2.86, df = 1, p = 0.0906; 
R2M&Z = 0.06).  When combined with belief outcomes related to enrolling in Model 1, 
dependence makes a stronger contribution to the model (LRχ2 = 4.77, df = 1, p = 
0.0289; Table 3).  The model fit was good (R2M&Z = 0.44) and four variables 
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significantly contributed to the prediction of intention to enroll.  First, for each level 
increase in dependence on the land for income, the odds of being likely to enroll 
decreases by 47%.  For every level increase in the likelihood of helping the target 
endangered species, the odds of being likely to enroll increase by 35%.  Each level 
increase in the perceived likelihood of improving one’s land by enrolling increases the 
odds of being likely to enroll by 78%.  Finally, for every increase in the perceived 
likelihood that enrolling will decrease one’s ability to make their own land-use 
decisions, the odds of being likely to enroll decrease by 40%.  Comparing standardized 
coefficients, improving land (β = 0.39) and losing the ability to make land-use decision 
(β = -0.36) made the strongest contribution to the model followed by helping the 
endangered species (β = 0.20) and dependence on the land for income (β = 0.20). 
Behavioral intention items were added in Model 2.  These items are considered 
to be ancillary because they measure intentions to enroll in generic programs to set aside 
wildlife habitat and to control juniper.  Both land management goals are related to the 
program but not directly related to endangered species per se.  The model fit improved 
over Model 1 (LRχ2 = 16.13, df = 2, p < 0.001) with an R2M&Z = 0.52.  Landowner 
dependence on land for income and helping endangered species are no longer important.  
Improving land and losing the ability to make land-use decisions are similar to Model 1.  
As the level of agreement with the behavioral intention to enroll in a cost-share program 
to set aside wildlife habitat increases, the odds of being likely to enroll in the endangered 
species program increase by 27%.  As the level of agreement with the behavioral 
intention to enroll in a program to clear juniper increases by one level, the odds of being 
likely to enroll increase by 30%.  Again, the strength with which a landowner believes 
enrolling will improve his or her land made the strongest contribution to the model (β = 
0.32) followed by losing the abililty to make land-use decision (β = -0.27), and the 
behavioral intention items (βWildlife = 0.22, βBrush Control = 0.21). 
The two past behavior items in Model 3 improved model prediction over Model 
2 (LRχ2 = 7.41, df = 2, p = 0.025, R2M&Z = 0.59).  Whether a landowner had previously 
participated in a conservation or wildlife management program within the past 10 years 
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(past program) was not significant.  A measure of whether a landowner cleared juniper 
on their land within the past 5 years did contribute to the model.  Landowners who 
cleared juniper have odds of being likely to enroll that are 255% greater than those who 
have not cleared brush.  The belief outcomes of improving land and losing the ability to 
make land-use decisions retained their significance as did the wildlife habitat behavioral 
intention item.  However, with the addition of the brush control past behavior item, the 
behavioral intention of enrolling in a program to control juniper is no longer statistically 
significant.  The standardized coefficients once again show that improving land (β = 
0.36) and losing the ability to make land-use decisions (β = -0.27) made strong 
contributions to predicting intention to enroll in the endangered species program.  
Clearing brush in the past 5 years (β = 0.23) and the wildlife habitat behavioral intention 
(β = 0.21) made moderate contributions to prediction. 
DISCUSSION 
Landowner response to the general behavioral intentions to enroll in a program to 
protect wildlife habitat and endangered species habitat serve as a baseline to understand 
initial reactions to programs in general.  Overall, just over half considered enrolling in a 
cost-share program for wildlife and this dropped when the wildlife concerned involved 
endangered species.  This is important but not surprising given recent work by Kreuter et 
al. (2006) who found that landowners in Colorado, Texas, and Utah generally disagreed 
with the normative statement that landowners should protect endangered species habitat 
without compensation from the public.  Furthermore, ranchers in Texas disagreed more 
strongly with this statement than either ranchers in Colorado or Utah.  Similarly, 
Raymond and Olive (2008) found that 41% of landowners had a negative reaction to the 
idea that they should bear the costs of protecting endangered species without incentives. 
Brook et al. (2003) found a positive correlation between landowners who disagreed that 
they should “bear financial responsibility” for conservation and landowners indicating 
they managed their property to minimize the chance of an endangered species occupying 
it.  Thus, programs directed toward endangered species recovery have a much higher 
burden to overcome to achieve the acceptance and enrollment levels of farm bill 
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programs; but, even participation in farm-bill programs can be low (see Kraft et al. 1996; 
Smith et al. 2007). 
 
 
Table 3. Odds ratios showing block regression of LRRP behavioral intention on outcomes of enrolling, 
behavioral intentions, and past behavior. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable Beliefs 
Beliefs & 
Behavioral 
Intentions 
Beliefs, Behavioral 
Intentions, & Past 
Behavior 
Intercept 0.1186 0.0096** 0.0039** 
Dependence 0.5319* 0.6802 0.6854 
Future Government 
Regulation 1.0303 1.1262 1.1134 
Help Endangered 
Species 1.3534
* 1.2240 1.2482 
Improve Land 1.7838*** 1.6823*** 1.8541*** 
Technical 
Assistance 0.9736 0.9576 0.9374 
Paperwork 0.9990 0.9452 0.9776 
Land-Use Decisions 0.5917*** 0.6524** 0.6322** 
Land Access 1.2830 1.2801 1.3672 
Financial 
Compensation 1.0653 1.0037 0.9613 
Wildlife Habitat 
Program Behavioral 
Intention 
1.2736** 1.2885** 
Brush Control 
Program Behavioral 
Intention 
1.3018** 1.2137 
Past Program 0.9498 
Control Brush 3.5508*** 
N 144 144 144
LL -75.6864 -67.6223 -63.9194
AIC 171.3727 159.2446 155.8389
R2M&Z 0.436 0.518 0.586
  *p ≤ .010, **p ≤ 0.05 ***p ≤ 0.01 
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While previous research and prevailing hypotheses lead to predictions that 
younger, more educated landowners with smaller parcels as well as those who do not 
rely on their land for income would be more amenable to enrolling in programs, I failed 
to detect such a relationship.  The literature supports this idea that background 
characteristics generally are poor predictors of specific behaviors (Ajzen and Fishbein 
1980).  When relationships are found, they are often sample-specific.  Segmenting 
landowners by demographic characteristics may be useful to group landowners based on 
general attitudes toward conservation programs.  Doing so, however, may ignore 
important landowner groups (e.g., those with large land holdings) and recruitment for 
conservation programs may occur at a suboptimal level.  Programs cannot rely on simple 
socio-demographic information to understand or predict participation.  Instead, social 
variables such as beliefs and motivations are needed to fully understand participation in 
conservation programs.  These items can account for the multiple satisfactions that 
landowners derive from their land; that is, landowners likely have multiple reasons for 
owning and operating land (Bliss and Martin 1989), and thus obtain multiple 
satisfactions from doing so.  Socio-demographic inquiries cannot capture this aspect of 
being a landowner. 
I did find support for the idea that landowner and land-use characteristics are 
related to a landowner’s perceived level of dependence on their land for income.  The 
notion derived from Jackson-Smith et al. (2005) that younger, more educated 
landowners would be less dependent on their land for income was supported.  
Landowners who identified themselves as ranchers and who had strong roots in their 
community were more dependent on their land for income.  There was partial support 
that dependence on land may help to explain intentions but more work needs to be done 
here.  Regardless, I prefer this measure of dependence over the traditional measure 
asking about the percent income derived from activities on the land.  This index is more 
akin to a motivation (i.e., operating land to obtain income) and characterizes the way in 
which a landowner thinks about and approaches operating his or her land.  It should be a 
more stable measure than the traditional measure because, for example, it can account 
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for landowners who made poor business decisions or who suffered due to weather 
conditions in the past year.   
I found that landowners, regardless of demographic characteristics, were willing 
to participate in the program when they expect to receive direct benefits from doing so.  
The importance of direct benefits was demonstrated by the important contributions of 
the outcome expectations related to improving land as well as the importance of the past 
behavior of restoring rangeland by clearing juniper.  Concerns about future regulations 
or financial compensation as outcomes of enrolling did not influence intention.  This is 
similar to Langpap (2004), who found that there was not a high perceived risk of 
regulation under the ESA for landowners in Oregon and Washington. 
The behavioral items enhanced prediction but also provide practical insights into 
enrollment.  Those that have cleared juniper in an effort to improve their rangeland are 
the most likely to enroll.  In this case, finding enrollees may be a matter of finding 
landowners interested in clearing juniper in order to improve their rangeland.  Working 
with the Natural Resource Conservation Service, for example, program administrators 
may be able to invite landowners from the waiting lists of programs like EQIP to 
participate in this program. 
Finally, concern about losing the ability to make land-use decision was important 
in this model.  Landowners recognize their responsibilities to neighbors, their 
community, and society in general and seem to be willing to consider the impacts of 
their actions for the greater good of society (Jackson-Smith et al. 2005).  At the same 
time, however, landowners value their independence and autonomy (e.g., Peterson and 
Horton 1995).  Raymond and Olive (2008) found this manifest in a sample of 
landowners within endangered Indiana bat (Myotis sodalis) territory.  On one hand, 
landowners in Indiana conceived of property as an intrinsic right, exempt from 
government influence.  Yet, they recognized some level of social responsibility and were 
willing to cooperate by accepting “reasonable” (495) limits on private land use.  In 
another study, landowners responding to a qualitative question asking why landowners 
do not enroll in conservation programs despite familiarity with programs cited concern 
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about government control over their land-use decisions as the primary factor (Smith et 
al. 2007).  Mehmood and Zhang (2005) found that landowners who expressed concerns 
about privacy and private property rights were less likely to enroll in the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service Safe Harbor program.  This finding that losing the ability to make land-
use decisions has a negative influence on intention to enroll may reflect a threat to the 
core values of landowners.  This may help to explain why landowners are more 
amenable to short-term conservation programs compared long-term programs (e.g., 
Olenick et al. 2005).   
One limitation of this study is that I was only able to measure behavioral 
intention and not actual behavior.  Although from a theoretical point of view intention 
predicts behavior, a number of factors can intervene including, for example, the degree 
to which an intention remains stable over time.  I have confidence in the measure 
because intentions predict actual behavior well when the target behavior is voluntary in 
nature such as enrolling in a conservation program (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980). 
MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS 
Farm and ranch lands make up a significant portion of private lands in the U.S. 
(Lubowski et al. 2006) and farming and ranching activities can benefit many listed 
species. To date, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service recovery efforts have largely ignored 
the so-called working landscape (Thompson Jr. 2006) but this has started to change with 
programs such as Safe Harbor (Rappaport Clark and Dalton 1999) and the recovery 
credit system (Hall 2008).  I show that coupling land management benefits within a 
conservation program for endangered species is important in obtaining landowner 
participation in endangered species recovery.  In central Texas, the black-capped vireo 
benefits from the management of juniper and prescribed burning.  Landowners also 
benefit from these management actions because they restore healthy rangeland.  Thus, 
conservation programs can enhance participation by taking advantage of any 
management technique that dovetails with a landowner’s land management goal.  
Additionally, programs may be able to use one species as an umbrella for other species.  
The golden-cheeked warbler, for example, requires reservation of mature mixed 
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hardwood stands.  In the program discussed here, the landowner enrolls to obtain the 
benefits provided by managing land for both endangered songbirds while also permitting 
areas to be reserved for the golden-cheeked warbler.  Although an opportunity cost 
exists for the term of the contract, the land is improved and available once the contract 
expires. 
Lessons for conservation program design derived from this research should be 
considered within the parameters of this endangered species program structure. 
Providing direct land improvement benefits to landowners seems to be important and is 
likely to be important in other compensation programs.  Additionally, some programs 
negotiate with landowners and then take a monitoring and enforcement role for the 
length of the program (e.g., a conservation easement).  Those programs that are more 
collaborative with landowners (i.e., share power) and permit landowners some control 
over their enrolled land are likely to be more attractive programs than those that do not. 
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CHAPTER III 
USING THE THEORY OF REASONED ACTION TO PREDICT INTENTIONS 
TO ENROLL IN AN INCENTIVE PROGRAM TO PROTECT ENDANGERED 
SPECIES 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the unequivocal achievements of the U.S. Endangered Species Act (ESA) 
is what Norris (2004, 290) characterizes as “institutionalized conservation considerations 
in federal agencies.”  Under Section 7 of the ESA federal agencies are prohibited from 
taking actions or engaging in projects that may jeopardize a species or its habitat.  This 
prohibition includes activities on federal lands as well as other activities that either 
receive federal dollars or require federal permits.   
Military lands represent only 3 to 4% of all federal lands yet, compared to all 
other land-holding federal agencies, harbor the largest concentration of species that 
either are listed, candidates for listing, or proposed to be listed (Stein et al. 2008).  About 
23% of these imperiled species use or rely on military lands with U.S. Army lands alone 
accounting for 15%.  Given the importance of military lands to assist in recovery efforts 
and biodiversity protection, the Department of Defense has taken its role seriously and 
worked to integrate wildlife conservation into the working landscape of military training 
and operations (Boice 2006). 
The Fort Hood military installation, located on forested oak-juniper mesas about 
halfway between Austin and Waco, Texas serves as the training ground for the Army’s 
largest armored force.  The 87,890-hectare installation also serves as breeding grounds 
for two endangered songbirds.  The black-capped vireo (Vireo atricapilla) is a small 
songbird that breeds locally in central Texas and winters in Mexico.  Vireos tend to 
prefer early successional habitat, patchy distribution of broadleaf shrubs within a matrix 
of grasses.  Ashe juniper (Juniperus ashei) is a native, invasive tree species that crowds 
out grassland and degrades vireo habitat.  Brush clearing and prescribed burning are the 
primary habitat management strategies for maintaining vireo habitat.  The golden-
cheeked warbler (Dendroica chrysoparia) is a habitat specialist that primarily breeds in 
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mixed hardwood forests in central Texas containing mature Ashe juniper trees and nests 
predominantly in stands occurring on steep slopes and in canyons (Ladd and Gass 1999).  
Because of its requirement for mature juniper, the primary management strategy for this 
species is to reserve land.  As Pekins (2006) notes, the birds share habitat in different 
successional stages. Roughly, if left alone, vireo habitat becomes warbler habitat; and, if 
burned, warbler habitat reverts to vireo habitat.  Fort Hood has taken an active role in the 
recovery of these two species and has exceeded recovery goals for each through 
intensive research on demographics, population trends, and threats, and by using 
adaptive management techniques to find ways, for example, to execute armored vehicle 
maneuvering in and around bird habitat (Pekins 2006).   
Despite the proactive efforts undertaken by Fort Hood, endangered species still 
represent an encroachment issue in that Army training is restricted as a result of the 
songbirds’ presence.  At the same time, Fort Hood faces other encroachment issues 
arising from land-use changes outside of its boundaries.  Boice (2006) discusses the 
importance of cooperating on natural resource management with landowners outside 
installation boundaries to reduce potential restrictions on training while enhancing 
endangered species recovery.  As argued by The Nature Conservancy (2008) on their 
website, the loss of mission capability can ultimately lead to base closure and an overall 
loss in conservation benefit.  The off-site program reduces the potential loss of mission 
capability.  Off-site conservation also protects more habitat across a wider geographic 
range which enhances overall recovery efforts by reducing risk from catastrophic events 
(Texas A&M Institute for Renewable Natural Resources 2008). It helps to correct the 
knowledge gap regarding endangered species use of private lands as discussed by 
Polasky and Doremus (1998) and demonstrates how endangered species recovery can be 
integrated into a working landscape (Thompson Jr. 2006). Programs such as the Private 
Lands Initiative at Fort Bragg, North Carolina have been successful in protecting 
endangered species habitat outside the Fort Bragg boundaries while reducing land-use 
restrictions within the installation (Housein 2006). 
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Fort Hood already has engaged in some off-site conservation planning and 
implementation through the Leon River Restoration Project (LRRP) (Wilkins 2004) as 
well as other tools such as permanent conservation easements and Safe Harbor 
agreements (Cloud 2005).  The LRRP uses performance contracts with provisions for 
landowners to receive full benefits from the program once the criteria of the program are 
fully completed.  The program focuses on brush clearing, specifically Ashe juniper, to 
restore rangeland and improve water flow and water quality.  Landowners enroll in the 
LRRP for a 5-year term and receive an 85% cost share for management costs.  The 
program assists with the management plan and implements the required brush clearing 
and prescribed burn.  These land management techniques enhance vireo habitat.  Land 
enrolled in the program that contains mature juniper is reserved as golden-cheeked 
warbler habitat.  The 15% paid by the landowner is set in an escrow account and 
returned to the landowner once the performance criteria are met (minus the cost of the 
prescribed burn).  The enrolled landowner is assured against future land regulation 
through Texas Parks & Wildlife Department code 12.0251 which prohibits department 
biologists from disclosing any information obtained from private land consultations to 
other persons or agencies. 
The successful design and implementation of the LRRP led to a pilot project to 
demonstrate a functional recovery credit system in which private landowners participate 
in a voluntary program to enhance black-capped vireo and golden-cheeked warbler 
habitat in exchange for financial incentives and technical guidance.  The purpose of this 
study was to assist Fort Hood in identifying landowners willing to engage in a 
conservation program to protect and maintain habitat for the golden-cheeked warbler and 
the black-capped vireo.  Given that the LRRP focused on rangeland restoration in 
general and that the RCS pilot study focuses on endangered songbirds, my objectives in 
this study were to predict landowners’ intentions to enroll in a conservation program 
specifically designed to enhance endangered species habitat and to understand factors 
that influence their decision to enroll.   
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Conceptual Framework 
Previous research in central Texas suggests that younger landowners who own 
land for recreational reasons are more likely to enroll than either landowners who 
viewed their property with a strong profit motive or those who were born and raised on 
their land and relied on their land as a source of income (Cearly-Sanders 2005).  Socio-
demographic characterization like this can be useful to segment landowners based on 
their general dispositions or attitudes toward conservation programs in general.  
Predictive ability, however, diminishes greatly when considering specific behaviors 
(Ajzen and Fishbein 1980).  In this study, I was interested in predicting intention to 
enroll in a specific performance contract.  Thus, I utilized the theory of reasoned action 
(TRA) to predict and explain landowner willingness to enroll. 
The reasoned action approach to understanding and predicting behavior assumes 
that individuals deliberately process information, weigh the positive and negative 
arguments of engaging in a particular behavior, and then incorporate this information in 
their decision to act.  It assumes that this decision to act, the behavioral intention, is the 
direct antecedent to actual behavior (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975).  The behavioral 
intention is described by Eagly and Chaiken (1993, 168) as a "person's motivation in the 
sense of his or her conscious plan to exert effort to carry out a behavior."  There are two 
distinct determinants of a behavioral intention.  The normative component is the social 
pressure an individual feels from salient referent groups to engage (or not engage) in a 
behavior.  Normative beliefs about what specific referent groups (e.g., family) believe an 
individual should do lead to an overall evaluation of social pressure to act.  The 
utilitarian component (Eagly and Chaiken 1993) involves the positive and negative 
outcomes the individual believes will occur as a result of engaging in a behavior.  These 
behavioral beliefs provide a cognitive foundation from which the formation of an 
attitude toward the behavior occurs.  This attitude is an overall positive or negative 
evaluation of executing the behavior of interest.  Figure 2 shows the schematic 
representation of the TRA. 
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Figure 2. Graphic representation of the Theory of Reasoned Action. 
 
 
Because behavioral intention is posited to predict behavior, the TRA is limited to 
voluntary behaviors (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980; Eagly and Chaiken 1993).  In response to 
criticisms that some behaviors are not simple, easily performed, or completely under 
volitional control, Ajzen (1991) introduced the theory of planned behavior which added 
perceived behavioral control as a third distinct determinant of behavioral intention.  
Perceived behavioral control is a combined measure of self-efficacy, an individual's 
perception about how easy or difficult it is to engage in a behavior, and beliefs about the 
extent to which performing the behavior is up to the individual (Ajzen 2002a).  
The reasoned action approach is appropriate when the behavior of interest is 
voluntary, when the decision to act lends itself to deliberation, and when the behavior is 
easily performed.  This was the case for my research question in which landowners were 
presented an option (measured as an intention) to enroll in a voluntary program to 
protect and maintain endangered species habitat.  Although I did not observe actual 
behavior, behavioral intention tends to be a good predictor of actual behavior under 
these same conditions (Ajzen and Fishbein 2005). 
The theory of reasoned action has been used in a wide variety of fields (see 
Ajzen and Fishbein 2005; Eagly and Chaiken 1993) including natural resource 
management.  For example, the TRA has been used to understand support for policies 
such as the National Park Service’s controlled burn policy (Bright et al. 1993) as well as 
policy initiatives related to trapping (Manfredo et al. 1997) and wildland preservation 
voting intentions (Vaske and Donnelly 1999).  Some work has been conducted on 
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proenvironmental behavior such as water conservation (e.g., Trumbo and O'Keefe 2005) 
and recycling behavior (Jones 1990).   
Although some research specifically has examined landowner willingness to 
protect endangered species on private lands, the work has largely focused on socio-
demographic variables as they relate to participation.  For example, studying factors 
influencing participation in an incentive program to provide endangered species habitat 
in Oregon and Washington, Langpap (2004) found participation was positively related to 
the importance a landowner places on wildlife habitat provided by the forest, the number 
of acres owned, and membership in conservation organizations.  As discussed above, 
these generally are individual characteristics.  Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) would argue 
that the relationship between characteristics and participation should be mediated by 
attitudinal and normative factors. Luzar and Diagne (1999) used a reasoned action 
formulation of attitudes and subjective norm related to participating in the Wetlands 
Reserve Program, a USDA program that purchases permanent easements and provides 
up to 75% cost-share for wetland restoration.  They allowed attitude and subjective norm 
to covary with (rather than mediate) external factors such as wetland acres owned, 
gender, etc. and found that attitude toward enrolling but not subjective norm contributed 
to prediction of participation. 
I expect a positive relationship between behavioral beliefs, attitudes and intention 
to enroll.  That is, landowners who believe that the outcome of enrolling will be positive 
will have more positive attitudes toward enrolling and will indicate a greater likelihood 
of enrolling.  The role of the normative component is less clear.  In much of the reasoned 
action literature, subjective norm is weakly related to intention (see Armitage and 
Conner 2001).  In fact, Luzar and Diagne (1999) found that subjective norm did not 
contribute to prediction of participation in the Wetlands Reserve Program.  This does not 
surprise me given that landowners are known to be highly independent, self-motivated 
decision makers (e.g., Peterson and Horton 1995).  I believe the null hypothesis of no 
effect may be supported for subjective norm. 
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Ancillary Behavioral Intentions 
Since Fishbein and Ajzen's (1975) conception of the behavioral intention as the 
proximal cause of behavior, intention has become an important component of theories of 
human social behavior (Ajzen and Fishbein 2005).  My research had a large practical 
component to it, to help the Department of Defense understand who (e.g., what types of 
landowners) would be most likely to enroll in a program.  As discussed above, I did not 
expect a socio-demographic analysis to provide a complete picture of landowner 
participation.  The TRA focuses on important social variables but ones that might be 
difficult for agencies and organizations to use to identify potential program participants.  
To improve prediction of behavioral intention I added behavioral intention items related 
to the program's attributes including setting aside wildlife habitat and clearing juniper on 
a portion of an individual's land.   
Intention to enroll in a program to set aside wildlife habitat served as a general 
measure of a landowner’s willingness to conserve wildlife on their land.  Based on the 
authors’ personal experience questions that refer to “wildlife” are usually conceived by 
landowners in this area as relating to deer, quail and other game species.  Clearing 
juniper is of interest to landowners because of its invasive nature.  It crowds out grasses, 
forbs and other rangeland shrubs and negatively affects water flow and water quality.  
Therefore, clearing juniper is an integral component of rangeland improvement and 
restoration efforts.  In central Texas, landowners who operate their land for crops and 
livestock tend to prefer little to no juniper whereas landowners who operate their land 
for wildlife (i.e., deer) and for recreational/aesthetic purposes prefer modest amounts of 
juniper cover (Thurow et al. 2001).  I expect that landowners interested in enrolling in 
either a wildlife habitat or juniper clearing performance contract will be more likely to 
enroll in the endangered species performance contract. 
Past Behavior 
Research within the reasoned action and planned behavior frameworks 
demonstrate that past behavior can be a good predictor of behavioral intention and 
subsequent behavior.  Furthermore, past behavior is often not fully mediated by attitude 
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or normative components and can account for a significant amount of variance (Ajzen 
and Fishbein 2005).  There are a number of reasons suggested as to why this occurs (see 
Ajzen 2002b; Rhodes and Courneya 2003).  For this research, I was interested more in 
the predictive validity of past behavior in helping to explain intention than in its proper 
fit within the TRA framework.   
Similar to the behavioral intention items above, the past behavior items used can 
be considered ancillary; that is, they do not directly correspond to the behavioral 
intention.  Landowners were asked about participation in past conservation programs 
including farm bill agricultural programs, wildlife conservation programs as well as 
wildlife management programs (e.g., co-operative planning with other landowners).  
Additionally, landowners were asked about clearing juniper on their land.  As discussed 
above, many landowners endeavor to improve their rangeland and water flow by 
removing young juniper.  I expect both items to be positively related to enrolling in the 
endangered species performance contract. 
Trustworthiness and Natural Resource Agencies 
I was interested in landowner perceptions about the trustworthiness of natural 
resource agencies.  These opinions are referred to by Paxton (1999) as abstract trust. It 
differs from specific trust in that one cannot specifically trust the government.  Instead, 
one can have confidence that government will perform as expected (Hardin (2000) cited 
in Liljeblad 2003).  Paxton notes that a person can evaluate trustworthiness of 
institutions because people trust expert systems to encapsulate their interests.  Levi and 
Stoker (2000, 491) conclude that judgments about trustworthiness of government “are 
generalized judgments that influence whether citizens endorse or reject existing 
authorities and public policy or institutional reforms.”  The more trustworthy citizens 
perceive the government to be, the more likely they are to cooperate and comply with 
regulations.  Trustworthiness of natural resource agencies can be an important 
characteristic given the history of command-and-control tactics to protect and manage 
natural resources.  I include trustworthiness of natural resource agencies because 
agencies either fund many incentive programs run by nongovernmental organizations or 
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administer these programs themselves.  I expect increased trustworthiness to be related 
to positive beliefs regarding the outcome of enrolling (i.e., behavioral beliefs) as well as 
normative beliefs. 
METHODS 
Sampling 
The population of interest in this study was landowners around the Fort Hood 
military installation who have potential habitat for the black-capped vireo and the 
golden-cheeked warbler.  To maintain consistency with previous research (i.e., Wilkins 
2004), my study sampled from the population of landowners in all or part of six counties 
surrounding Ft. Hood including: Bell, Bosque, Coryell, Hamilton, Lampasas, and 
McLennan County.   
I constructed a sampling frame using landowner information obtained from each 
of the six county tax appraisal districts.  For each county, I used GIS to overlay a golden-
cheeked warbler habitat model created by Jones (2006) and selected landowners with a 
moderate to high probability of having golden-cheeked warbler habitat.  I further 
restricted the sampling frame to landowners with at least 10 hectares (25 acres) because 
it is sizeable enough to accommodate a breeding pair (e.g., Anders and Dearborn 2004) 
and it is of interest given the current demographic trend in Texas land ownership toward 
smaller-sized properties (Wilkins, Brown et al. 2003).  Finally, landowner information 
was submitted to a consumer information company and available phone numbers were 
obtained resulting in a sampling frame of 542 landowners. 
Sampling was stratified by county only to facilitate data collection and the results 
were treated as a random sample.  Because endangered species issues are not salient for 
most landowners (e.g., Raymond and Olive 2008), my research protocol involved four 
steps.  First, I sent a letter to the landowner’s mailing address advising them that I would 
be calling regarding a project on wildlife conservation.  For landowners who agreed to 
participate, a face-to-face structured interview was conducted focusing on land-use and 
landowner characteristics.  All interviews were conducted by the first author and two 
interviewers trained by the first author.  At the end of the 15-minute interview, a self-
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administered questionnaire containing the programmatic items was left with the 
participant along with a thank-you gift, a small watercolor print of a local landscape.  To 
ensure a suitable response rate for the self-administered questionnaire I used a rolling 
reminder procedure adapted from the Dillman (2000) mail survey technique.  One week 
after each round of interviews, I sent a thank you/reminder postcard followed 3 weeks 
and 7 weeks later by a reminder letter and replacement questionnaire.  Interviewing 
began in April 2007 and ended in November, 2007. 
Measurement and Analysis 
The self-administered questionnaire assessed landowner intention to enroll in a 
cost-share program to protect and maintain endangered species habitat using a single-
item measure.  The program structure was identical to a small rangeland restoration pilot 
project already implemented in the area (see Wilkins 2004); however, I did not refer to 
the project title and reframed it as an endangered species protection program 
(incorporating brush control).  Using a seven-point scale where from extremely unlikely 
to extremely likely, landowners were asked about enrolling in the following program 
within the next six months: 
This program is run by a local non-profit group in central Texas. 
Landowners volunteer for the program and enroll in a 5-year performance 
contract to manage their land for two species of endangered birds. It 
provides 85% cost sharing to landowners to clear Ashe juniper, also 
called cedar, and to conduct a prescribed/controlled burn on a portion of 
their land.  The contract also includes preserving some areas of mature 
oak-juniper woodlands on steep slopes and in canyons. The program 
provides assistance with the management plan and conducts the brush 
clearing and burn for the landowner. The benefits of this program include 
improved grazing capacity, ground & surface water conservation, and 
enhanced wildlife habitat. After the contract expires and the performance 
criteria are met, the landowners are reimbursed the remaining 15% of the 
costs (minus the costs for the prescribed burn) and are free to operate the 
land in whatever way they desire. 
 
The Theory of Reasoned Action incorporates specific methods for measuring 
attitude, the subjective norm, and their related beliefs (see Ajzen 2002a).1  I directly 
assessed landowners’ attitudes toward enrolling using three 7-point scales that were 
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scored from -3 to +3.2  Landowners evaluated enrolling on an instrumental level 
(extremely foolish to extremely wise); an experiential level (extremely undesirable to 
extremely desirable); and, an overall evaluation (very bad to very good).  A summed 
index (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.92) was created.   
I constructed the subjective norm using two 7-point scales scored from -3 to +3.  
The first item asked landowners how people important to them would feel if they 
enrolled in this program (strongly disapprove to strongly approve).  The second item 
asked whether important referents thought the landowner should enroll in the program 
(definitely false to definitely true).  These items were summed to create an index (r = 
0.78, p < 0.01). 
I assessed landowner beliefs about enrolling in the program using a list of eight 
salient outcomes identified by a focus group of landowners in the area.  These included 
outcomes related to the potential for future land-use regulation, helping the endangered 
species, improving their land, getting technical assistance, the amount of paperwork, 
making their own land-use decisions, having people they do not know access their land, 
and receiving adequate financial compensation.  Using a seven-point scale from -3 to +3, 
landowners rated the likelihood that each outcome would occur (extremely unlikely to 
extremely likely) as well as an evaluation of the outcome (extremely undesirable to 
extremely desirable).  For each landowner, the belief strength was multiplied by the 
evaluation and all eight items were summed to create an overall behavioral belief score. 
Two specific referent groups, family and other landowners, were used to assess 
perceived normative pressures to enroll the program.  Respondents were asked to 
indicate the truth of the statements that each of these two groups thought the landowners 
should enroll (definitely false to definitely true) and their motivation to comply with 
what each referent group: “What [group] thinks about enrolling…is important to me.”  
These items were scored in a unipolar fashion from 1 to 7.  For each landowner, the 
normative belief strength was multiplied by the motivation to comply and two were 
summed to create an overall normative belief score. 
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Two ancillary behavioral intentions were used to assess landowner behavioral 
intentions related to the land management goals of the program.  They were assessed 
separately from the target program and prefaced with the following text: 
Assume each performance contract below compensates you for fair 
market value or economic loss and tell us how likely it is that you would 
enroll based on each land management goal.   
If given the opportunity within the next 6 months, I intend to enroll in a 
performance contract where I receive a financial incentive to… 
 
The first item asked landowners about their intention to enroll in a performance 
contract to “set aside a portion of my land as wildlife habitat.”  The second item asked 
landowners to indicate their intention to enroll in a performance contract to “control 
brush, such as Ashe juniper (cedar), on a portion of my land.”  Each item was measured 
using a 7-point scale from extremely unlikely to extremely likely. 
I assessed past behavior related to previous participation in a conservation 
program as well as the land-management technique of clearing juniper.  First, a binary 
variable was created to indicate whether landowners had participated in a conservation 
program or a wildlife management program within the past 10 years.  Second, a binary 
variable indicated whether landowners had cleared juniper on a portion of their land 
within the past 5 years. 
I also incorporated a number of external factors in this model.  Ajzen and 
Fishbein (1980) argue that all other factors including individual characteristics are 
mediated by beliefs and thus can be considered as background factors; thus, there is no 
reason for these factors to be directly related to behavior.  For this research I included 
age and education (1 = College, Graduate, or Professional Degree, 0 = Other) to 
control for landowners who may be more pro-environment (Jones and Dunlap 1992).  
Similarly, research suggests that landowners who do not rely on their land for income 
are more likely to engage in conservation behaviors or in conservation programs 
(Olenick et al. 2005; Kline et al. 2000).  I used three items to control for this.  First, a 
binary variable was created by identifying those landowners who were employed outside 
the agricultural field.  Second, I included the size of a property that a landowner actually 
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manages.3  It was log transformed to reduce positive skew.  Third, an index was created 
from three items to assess a landowner’s perceived dependence on the land for income.  
These were measured using a 7-point Likert scale from strongly disagree to strongly 
agree and included the following items: “My place is an important source of income,” 
“My place is a business,” and “My place is a way to financially provide for my family” 
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.89).   
I also placed the agency trust items as background factors.  General perceptions 
of the trustworthiness of natural resource agencies are not salient beliefs related to 
enrollment per se.  Instead they are more diffuse and may influence these beliefs.  The 
trustworthiness of three agencies, Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS), 
Texas Parks and Wildlife Department (TPWD), and the Agricultural Extension Service, 
was assessed along five dimensions: honesty, confidentiality, confidence, competence, 
and fidelity using a single question for each measured on a 7-point scale from strongly 
disagree to strongly agree.  To capture an overall level of trustworthiness, an index was 
created for each agency.  Cronbach’s alphas for the NRCS, TPWD, and Agricultural 
Extension were 0.88, 0.85, and 0.82 respectively. 
I employed OLS regression to examine each of the model’s hypotheses.  First, 
the standard TRA model was estimated including the background variables used in this 
study.  Second, two additional predictor variables, past program participation and 
intention to enroll in a wildlife habitat program were added.  Finally, two brush control 
items were added: intention to enroll in a juniper-clearing program and past behavior 
related to clearing juniper.  Improvement in prediction is assessed using the change in 
model fit (i.e., R2).  Except where noted, adjusted R2 values are reported.  To produce 
OLS estimates that incorporate missing-data uncertainty, missing data were estimated 
using a multiple imputation process (see Allison 2002) (PROC MI and PROC 
MIANALYZE in SAS version 9.1.3).  Because some variables were transformed, 
standardized regression coefficients are reported.   
Finally, because I added new variables for the purpose of improving prediction, I 
conducted a commonality analysis to partition the model’s variance into its constituent 
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parts.  Commonality analysis uses structure coefficients (rs), the bivariate correlation 
between a predictor variable in the model and the predicted outcome ( yˆ ), to “evaluate 
which predictors do or could produce the predicted outcome scores” (Courville and 
Thompson 2001, 240).  Structure coefficients are an essential complement to 
standardized coefficients (β) when understanding the contribution of a variable to 
prediction in a regression analysis (Thompson and Borrello 1985).  For example, a 
predictor variable may have a strong correlation with the dependent variable but have 
near-zero beta weight because other correlated predictors in the model share explanatory 
ability.  Consulting only standardized beta weights in this instance would lead to the 
erroneous conclusion that the variable does not contribute to prediction.  The output 
reported here represents the amount of variance a predictor or combination of predictors 
shares with the overall variance (i.e., the R2).4  As discussed by Reichewin Zientek and 
Thompson (2006), regression coefficients where both β = 0 and rs = 0 indicate a 
worthless predictor.  Instances in which both coefficients are large indicate a good 
predictor.  When rs is large but β is zero, the predictor is good but “denied productive 
credit” (p. 300) because of multicollinearity.  Finally, when β is large but rs is near 0, the 
predictor indirectly improves prediction. 
RESULTS 
I calculated a phone response rate of 45% of 542 landowners using the American 
Association for Public Opinion Research (2006) standards.  Of the 245 self-administered 
questionnaires left with participants, 214 were returned for a self-administered survey 
response rate of 87%.  Of these, 202 cases were usable (e.g., complete).  Four additional 
individuals were removed because they did not provide an answer on the dependent 
variable.  The final sample size considered in this analysis was 198. 
The average age of landowners in the sample was 64 years (sd = 11).  A vast 
majority were male (87%), white (97%), and not Spanish/Hispanic (98%).  More than 
one-half (54%) completed a 4-year college degree, or higher.   
The average area owned was 141 hectares (sd = 183 hectares) with a median of 
75 hectares.  A plurality (42%) of landowners owned between 41 and 202 hectares.  On 
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average, landowners managed 163 hectares (sd = 360) with a median of 49 hectares.  
About 13% leased out their entire property in the past year resulting in 0 managed 
hectares and 64% managed between 10 and 202 hectares. 
Landowners had owned their land for an average of 21 years (sd = 15 years) and 
19% were absentee landowners who did not live on their land and who considered their 
land to be in a separate community from their residence.  Absentee landowners lived an 
average of 50 (sd = 60) miles from their place.  The majority of landowners (83%) were 
retired or had a job that was not directly related to agriculture.  On average, landowners 
relied on their land for 14% of their annual household income and most (78%) relied on 
the land for 15% or less of their annual income. 
 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics for variables used in the Theory of Reasoned Action. 
Variable Mean Std Dev Range 
Behavioral Intention 4.01 2.26 1 to 7
Attitude 3.22 4.86 -9 to +9
Behavioral Beliefs 2.98 15.54 -72 to +72
Subjective Norm 0.32 3.18 -12 to +12
Normative Beliefs 32.29 21.41 2 to 98
Age 64.30 11.62 26 to 92
Hectares Managed 161.85 360.61 0 to 3351
Agency Trustworthiness  
Natural Resource 
Conservation Service 4.79 1.28 1 to 7
Texas Parks & Wildlife 
Department 4.97 1.16 1 to 7
Agricultural Extension 
Service 5.02 1.20 1 to 7
Depend 3.88 2.17 1 to 7
 Percent  
College Degree or Higher 53  
Non-Agricultural Job 50  
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Theory of Reasoned Action 
Landowners, on average, were unsure about enrolling in the performance 
contract (Table 4).  Although landowners generally expressed positive attitudes and 
beliefs, they were very weak.  When considering family and other landowners, 
respondents on average felt social pressure to not enroll but the subjective norm, the 
evaluation of the perceived social pressure to enroll, was very close to zero indicating 
that, on average, landowners overall did not perceive positive or negative pressure to 
enroll.  
When intention was regressed on attitude and subjective norm, the model 
explained 40% of the variance (Figure 3).  The standardized coefficient for attitude was 
large (β = 0.53) and uniquely explained over one-third (38%) of the model’s variance 
(see Model 1 in Table 5).  Subjective norm had a small standardized coefficient (β = 
0.14, p = 0.07) and had nearly zero unique ability (1%) to predict variance in intention to 
enroll.  On the surface, it may seem that subjective norm is not an important component 
of predicting intention to enroll in the endangered species program.  However, 60% of 
the variance explained by the model can be attributed to the common variance between 
attitude and subjective norm.  Consequently, subjective norm is an important component 
of the model despite the fact that it makes little unique contribution to prediction. 
Despite the weak relationship between subjective norm and intention, normative 
beliefs and subjective norm were strongly correlated (β = 0.77), indicating that 
landowners felt pressure to comply with salient referents (i.e., other landowners and their 
family) even if it did not ultimately influence their intention to enroll.  Behavioral beliefs 
were positively and significantly related to attitude (β = 0.37) indicating that as expected 
outcomes of enrolling become more positive, attitude toward enrolling becomes more 
positive.  Of all the background factors considered, only the trustworthiness of the Texas 
Parks & Wildlife Department was related to beliefs.  Specifically, an increasing 
perception of trustworthiness marginally was related to beliefs about the outcome of 
enrolling (β = 0.15, p = 0.09) and was significantly associated with increased social 
pressure from salient referents to enroll (β = 0.22).   
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Figure 3. Theory of reasoned action model including statistically significant background variables.  
Standardized coefficients are reported. All variables are statistically significant at p < 0.05 except those 
marked with a “*” are significant at p < 0.10.  For the prediction of intention (n = 198), R = 0.63 and R2adj 
= 0.40. 
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Table 5.  Variance partitioning for each model using commonality analysis. “Partition” indicates the 
contribution of the item to the overall variance. For each model the partition should sum to the R2 for that 
model.  The “Percent of Total” indicates the relative contribution of each item in the model and is equal to 
(Partition/R2)*100%. 
Model R2 Item Partition 
% of 
Total 
1 0.40 Unique to Attitude 0.15 38%
  Unique to Subjective Norm 0.01 2%
  Common to Attitude, Subjective Norm 0.24 60%
2 0.47 Unique to Attitude 0.08 17%
  Unique to Subjective Norm 0.01 1%
  Unique to Past Program 0.00 1%
  Unique to Wildlife Habitat Program 0.06 12%
  Common to Attitude, Subjective Norm 0.10 21%
  Common to Attitude, Past Program 0.00 1%
  Common to Attitude, Wildlife Habitat Program 0.06 12%
  Common to Subjective Norm, Past Program 0.00 0%
  Common to Subjective Norm, Wildlife Habitat Program 0.01 1%
  Common to Past Program, Wildlife Habitat Program 0.00 1%
  Common to Attitude, Subjective Norm, Past Program 0.00 -1%
  Common to Attitude, Subjective Norm, Wildlife Habitat Program 0.15 31%
  
Common to Attitude, Past Program, Wildlife 
Habitat Program 
 
0.01 2%
  Common to Subjective Norm, Past Program, Wildlife Habitat Program 0.00 0%
  Common to Attitude, Subjective Norm, Past Program, Wildlife Habitat Program 0.00 0%
3 0.53 Unique to Attitude 0.07 13%
  Unique to Subjective Norm 0.01 2%
  Unique to Past Program 0.00 0%
  Unique to Wildlife Habitat Program 0.01 3%
  Unique to Brush Control Program 0.03 5%
  Unique to Brush Clearing 0.03 5%
  Common to Attitude, and Subjective Norm 0.11 20%
  Common to Attitude, Wildlife Habitat Program 0.02 3%
  Common to Attitude, Brush Clearing 0.01 2%
  
Common to Wildlife Habitat Program, Brush 
Control Program 0.03 5%
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Table 5. continued. 
Model R2 Item Partition 
% of 
Total 
  
Common to Wildlife Habitat Program, Brush 
Clearing 0.01 2%
  
Common to Attitude, Subjective Norm, Wildlife 
Habitat Program 0.07 13%
  
Common to Attitude, Wildlife Habitat Program, 
Brush Control Program 0.03 5%
  
Common to Wildlife Habitat Program, Brush 
Control Program, Brush Clearing 0.01 3%
  
Common to Attitude, Subjective Norm, Wildlife 
Habitat Program, Brush Control Program 0.07 13%
  
Common to Attitude, Wildlife Habitat Program, 
Brush Control Program, Brush Clearing 0.01 2%
  
Common to Attitude, Subjective Norm, Wildlife 
Habitat Program, Brush Control Program, Brush 
Clearing 
0.01 1%
  Other Common Variancea 0.01 3%
aThis category contains all other combinations of variables each of which explains less 
than 1% of the R2 value. 
 
 
 
When previous participation in a conservation/wildlife management program and 
a landowner’s intention to enroll in a performance contract to set aside wildlife habitat 
were added to the model, the amount of variance explained (adjusted R2) increased to 
46% (Figure 4).  The wildlife habitat behavioral intention significantly contributed to the 
model while the past program participation variable (p = 0.30) did not.  Interpreting this 
result using the unstandardized coefficient (b = 0.27), for every one-level increase in the 
likelihood of enrolling in a wildlife habitat program the likelihood of enrolling in the 
endangered species performance contract increases by 0.27 on average.  The 
commonality analysis (see Model 2 in Table 5) shows that compared to Model 1 the 
wildlife habitat program decreases the unique contribution of attitude to the model.  The 
variance common to attitude and subjective norm (21% of the total R2) as well as these 
two items with the wildlife habitat intention (31% of the total R2) is important in 
predicting intention. 
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Figure 4. Adding ancillary items to improve prediction. a.) Past program is a binary variable indicating 
whether a landowner has participated in a wildlife conservation or management program in the past 10 
years.  Wildlife BI is a behavioral intention item asking landowners about enrolling in a program to set 
aside habitat for wildlife. Standardized coefficients are reported. All variables are statistically significant 
at p < 0.05 except those marked with a “#.”  For the prediction of intention (n = 198), R = 0.68 and R2adj = 
0.46. b.) Adding brush-related items.  Brush control is a binary variable indicating whether a landowner 
has cleared juniper on their land within the past 5 years..  Brush BI is a behavioral intention item asking 
landowners about enrolling in a program to clear juniper on their land. Standardized coefficients are 
reported. All variables are statistically significant at p < 0.05 except those marked with a “#.”  For the 
prediction of intention (n = 198), R = 0.73 and R2adj = 0.52. 
 
 
a.) 
b.) 
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The final model incorporated two items related to brush control (Figure 3b) and 
model fit improved again (adjusted R2 = 0.52).  Interpreting this result using the 
unstandardized coefficient, every one-level increase in the likelihood of enrolling in a 
program to control juniper is associated with an average 0.21 increase in the likelihood 
of enrolling in the endangered species program.  Additionally, the likelihood of enrolling 
in the endangered species program is 0.77 higher on average for landowners who have 
cleared juniper on their land in the past five years compared to those that have not 
cleared juniper.  Again, both attitude and subjective norm were important in prediction.  
The brush control items each uniquely accounted for 5% of the overall variance 
explained (see Model 3 in Table 5).  The common variance between attitude, subjective 
norm, and the wildlife habitat program (13%) as well as between attitude, subjective 
norm, the wildlife habitat program, and the brush control program (13%) are important 
components of overall variance. 
DISCUSSION 
My results suggest that the basic theory of reasoned action predicts private 
landowners’ intentions to enroll in an endangered species conservation program quite 
well with good-fitting models (adjusted R2 ranged from 0.40 to 0.53).  Fishbein and 
Ajzen (1975) discuss that the relative weights of the attitudinal and normative 
components should be expected to vary across behaviors and, within a behavior, across 
populations.  My finding that attitude had a stronger relationship to intention than 
subjective norm was consistent with Armitage and Conner’s (2001) meta-analysis.  
However, as the commonality analysis for the Model 1 showed, most of the variance 
(60%) was shared by subjective norms and attitudes.  Despite the lack of a unique 
contribution, subjective norms are an integral component of the reasoned action model.   
Since their original conception of reasoned action Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) 
have contended that variables not specified by the TRA have only an indirect effect 
through attitude, subjective norm or by affecting the relative weights of each via 
moderation or mediation.  This seems to be the case here.  Compared to Model 1, the 
unique contribution of attitude to explaining variance was less than half as much in 
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Model 2 and even less in Model 3.  Thus, the explanatory power of the added variables 
seems to be borrowing to some degree from the attitude variable.  This can be seen in the 
variance shared by attitude and the wildlife habitat program behavioral intention (12% of 
the total variance explained in Model 2).  Despite the shared variance, the model’s 
adjusted R2 did increase with the additional variables indicating that these items 
provided a unique contribution to prediction beyond attitude and subjective norm. 
Although adding the ancillary behavioral intentions reduced the contribution of 
attitude to predicting intention, they are not a component of attitude.  The ancillary 
behavioral intentions violate the reasoned action principle of compatibility because they 
are not related to enrolling in the endangered species program per se.  Instead, they are 
related to the land-management goals within the endangered species program.  Although 
empirically correlated with attitude, they do not represent an attitude toward the 
behavior.  At the same time, because they are behavioral intentions, they should be fairly 
proximate to behavior.  For these reasons, I regressed intention directly on these items 
rather than positioning them elsewhere in the TRA model.  Based on my findings, I 
believe that for a multiattribute dependent variable additional behavioral predictors 
related to key attributes may help to explain unique variance.  This is an area for further 
research. 
These additional behavioral items also offer some practical insight into ways to 
find and recruit private landowners.  Landowner characteristics generally were not 
related to behavioral or normative beliefs about enrolling.  Despite support from some of 
the literature (e.g., Cearly-Sanders 2005; Langpap 2004; Raedeke et al. 2001), a 
suboptimal strategy to recruit landowners for this program would be to segment the 
population by socio-demographic characteristics.  Instead, a better strategy would be to 
seek landowners interested in having or improving wildlife habitat on their land, 
landowners interested in improving their land by clearing juniper, and landowners with 
favorable attitudes towards the program in general.  Extension specialists, for example, 
could identify potential participants through their workshops and other events.  The 
Natural Resource Conservation Service may cooperate by providing the program with 
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landowners on the waiting list for Farm Bill programs like the Environmental Quality 
Incentives Program.  The program itself could directly recruit landowners interested in 
clearing juniper by holding public meetings. 
In many ways, the conservation program examined in this study represents an 
ideal program structure.  The landowner who successfully completes the contract pays 
only the costs of the prescribed burn, enhances the availability and quality of forage for 
livestock on their land, has no obligation to the endangered species once the contract is 
complete, and has very strong confidentiality assurances from the state.  The main 
drawback of this program is administrative; it is expensive to implement.  Although I 
view incentive programs such as this one as correcting the perverse incentive structure 
created by the historical implementation of the Endangered Species Act (Bean 1998; 
Mann and Plummer 1995), others have criticized programs as rewarding land 
management behavior that landowners should be doing anyway (e.g.,Raymond 2006).  
Thus, some question remains about whether and how much society should pay to private 
landowners to protect endangered species, especially if agreements are not in perpetuity.  
Similar to Kline et al.’s (2000) finding that higher incentive levels are needed to elicit 
participation from some types of landowners compared to others, even higher incentive 
levels likely are needed for endangered species-related programs as compared to other 
wildlife and general conservation programs. 
Given this ideal program structure, about half of the landowners indicated an 
intention to enroll.  The question here relates to whether this is a high or low level of 
potential cooperation.  Given the brevity of the program description (i.e., lack of detail) I 
believe 50% can serve as a lower bound of cooperation.  At the same time, this research 
focused only on program structure and not implementation.  Cooperation rates surely are 
influenced by factors such as who implements the program and how it is administered.   
The question about cooperation rate also highlights a limitation of this research.  
Although the TRA tends to predict behavior well when the target behavior is voluntary 
and the decision to act is deliberative rather than driven by affect or impulse, I did not 
actually observe behavior.  The program on which this study was based (Wilkins 2004) 
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was real but I stripped its name and reframed it as endangered species protection, thus 
creating a hypothetical scenario.  Consequently, I am limited to discussing prediction of 
intentions.  Previous research demonstrates the potential disconnect between attitudes, 
intention and behavior.  For example, Pager and Quillian (2005) found a discrepancy 
between employers’ expressed attitudes and actual behaviors toward hiring ex-offenders 
and/or blacks leading them to conceive of attitudes as principled beliefs held by the 
employers.  Based on this and other research on explicit and implicit attitudes, I only can 
speak to the “principled intentions” of landowners. 
One final limitation is that I investigated a specific program type (i.e., 
performance contract) and a specific program structure.  As a result, my findings and 
discussion must be qualified by the program examined here.  Future research should 
consider landowners’ preferences for different types of programs and program structure 
including the tradeoffs landowners are willing to make.  Work in this area already has 
begun.  Langpap (2004; 2006), for example, compares different levels of incentives, 
assurances, and technical assistance to understand the potential for private landowner’s 
to protect endangered species and finds potential for programs to be successful. 
CONCLUSION 
Landowners who have positive attitudes toward enrolling and share the same 
land management objectives as the program tend to be those who indicate an intention to 
enroll.  External variables related to landowner or land characteristics generally were not 
related to intention.  Given a nearly ideal program structure, landowner interest in 
participating was moderate at best. Programs like this one, with high levels of 
compensation, likely are not sustainable from a policy perspective.  Programs can 
become more self sustaining (i.e., cost effective) by incorporating market mechanisms.  
For example, the recovery credit system’s auction approach requires landowners to bid 
the levels of cost share, technical assistance and contract length.  As landowners learn 
about the experience of participants through observation and social networks, more may 
be willing to participate (Rogers 1995). 
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NOTES 
1. We originally included two perceived behavioral control items for Ajzen’s 
(1991) theory of planned behavior but both items (measured on a 7-point Likert-
type scale) were highly skewed with 51% strongly agreeing with the statement “I 
could enroll if I wanted to” (mean = 5.6, sd = 1.8, median = 7)  and 74% strongly 
agreeing with the statement “Enrolling is entirely up to me” (mean = 6.2, sd = 
1.6, median = 7).  Ajzen and Madden (1986, 459-460) note that when perceived 
behavioral control is high, “the concept of perceived behavioral control becomes 
largely irrelevant for prediction of behavior and the theory of planned behavior 
reduces to the theory of reasoned action.” 
2. An optimal scaling analysis was conducted to determine if bipolar or unipolar 
scaling was used. 
3. Hectares managed was calculated as Hectares Owned + Hectares Leased In – 
Hectares Leased Out. 
4. Those interested in the exact logic and formulas for this technique can consult 
Seibold and McPhee (1979) and Rowell (1996).  We used Nimon et al.’s (2008) 
code written for the statistical software package, R, to compute commonality 
coefficients. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE INFLUENCE OF PROGRAM STRUCTURE ON PARTICIPATION IN AN 
ENDANGERED SPECIES CONSERVATION PROGRAM 
INTRODUCTION 
The importance of conservation on working lands increasingly has been 
recognized as integral to stemming biodiversity loss.  Rosenzweig (2003), for example, 
argues that a sole focus on reservation and restoration strategies to protect biodiversity 
will ultimately fail.  Empirical evidence shows that human-dominated ecosystems can 
provide adequate connectivity between reserved lands and even increase biodiversity by 
maintaining land in early and mid-successional states (Tscharntke et al. 2005; Firbank 
2005; Pimentel and Stachow 1992).  Working lands make up much of the 90 to 95% of 
the earth's land surface not in reserves.  For example, agricultural lands in the U.S. 
currently account for 52% of the nation's 2.3 billion acres (Lubowski et al. 2006).  Shen 
(1987) estimates that from 21 to 52% of major terrestrial ecosystem types are not 
represented in protected areas in the United States.  Scott et al. (2001) show that nature 
reserves tend to have less productive soils and occur at higher elevations compared to 
other lands.  Many imperiled species use or rely on working lands for habitat.  The GAO 
(1995) estimated that 90% of species listed as endangered in the U.S. have habitat on 
nonfederal lands and that a number of these species rely on private lands for habitat.     
Given the under-representation of ecosystem types in protected areas and the 
dependence of endangered species on private lands, successful recovery efforts hinge on 
the private landowner.  Early attempts to stem biodiversity loss on public and private 
lands in the United States relied solely on regulation and enforcement strategies.  As a 
contemporary example, the Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973 has been a central 
policy tool in biodiversity protection in the United States.   
Although the Endangered Species Act was meant to correct an incentive problem 
that leads to animal and plant extinction at the risk of negatively affecting human well 
being, it seemingly exacerbated the problem on private lands.  Since the passage of the 
ESA in 1973, a lack of funding, problems with enforcement (Bean 1998), an over-
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reliance on biologists to solve social conflict (Kellert 1994), a heavy-handed approach to 
implementation, and a bureaucratic structure that precludes organizational learning, 
flexibility, and adaptability (Clark 1997) has led to a policy that is effective at preventing 
extinction but ineffective at promoting recovery (Norris 2004).  Private landowners have 
had little reason to engage in beneficial land management practices that would help 
endangered species (Bean 1998).  In fact, because the ESA as initially written and 
implemented required landowners to fully bear the costs of recovery even though society 
benefits from increased biodiversity, it unintentionally created perverse incentives for 
landowners to manage their properties in ways that harm endangered species (e.g., 
Lueck and Michael 2003) and alienated land stewards who might otherwise take steps to 
protect endangered species on their own.  An additional consequence is that information 
collection about species populations and conservation on private land occurs at 
suboptimal levels because, in most cases, private landowners can refuse to allow the 
federal government to access their land (Polasky and Doremus 1998). 
Private lands are integral to endangered species recovery and the ESA has been 
ineffective in this regard.  Consequently, the use of incentive programs as a means to 
promote endangered species recovery on private lands has increased greatly over the 
past two decades (e.g., Parkhurst and Shogren 2003; Land Trust Alliance 2005).  
Incentives work by using the carrot of monetary and nonmonetary rewards rather than 
the stick of land-use restrictions or prosecution for harming a listed species (Shogren 
2005).  The logic of the incentive is that because the benefits of endangered species 
protection accrue to the entire nation, the burden (i.e., cost) is shifted from the individual 
landowner to society through a government agency or private organization.   
The logic behind the incentive program is sound but like many solutions to 
complex problems the devil is in the details.  A number of types of incentive-based 
agreements exist such as conservation easements and cost-share programs (Parkhurst 
and Shogren 2003).  These programs can offer either monetary incentives, non-monetary 
incentives, or both (Hadlock and Beckwith 2002).  Adding to the complexity, 
landowners own their land for many reasons including investment, recreation, or 
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production; and, these landowners may have differing inclinations to accept different 
types or levels of incentives.  Differing levels of incentives may be required to obtain 
cooperation from different landowners.  To date, little focus has been on the design of 
programs as it relates to the incentive offered.  Focusing on program design is important 
because incentives that do not reflect the preferences of landowners lead to suboptimal 
levels of conservation.  My purpose was to understand the role of the structure of an 
incentive program in improving endangered species recovery on private lands while 
accounting for heterogeneity in landowners.  Specifically, I used a choice model to 
examine the combinations of incentives needed to engender cooperation, the trade-offs 
landowners may be willing to make when choosing to participate, as well as the 
individual factors that may be related to cooperation.   
Previous Research 
A limited number of empirical investigations of the role of incentives in 
enhancing endangered species recovery on private lands exist but we are starting to 
understand factors that influence cooperation.  I begin by describing a series of papers 
that focus on the endangered red-cockaded woodpecker (Picoides borealis) and the Safe 
Harbor incentive program.  Safe Harbor was created by the federal government in 1999 
to encourage landowners to voluntarily protect land for endangered species without fear 
of future prohibitions (Rappaport Clark and Dalton 1999).  Landowners are provided 
with assurances that when the agreement ends they can use the property in any manner 
that doesn’t reduce the endangered species’ population below pre-agreement baseline 
conditions.  Safe Harbor, however, provides no financial incentives to landowners.  
Zhang and Mehmood (2002) surveyed participants of the Safe Harbor program and 
found that landowners identified perceived risk (i.e., woodpecker nesting on nearby 
lands), an expectation for increased future timber sales, a desire to reduce risk and 
uncertainty, the ability to assist in woodpecker recovery, and the desire to be known as 
good stewards as important factors for enrolling.  Landowners were neutral on the costs, 
time, and paperwork involved, and did not identify technical assistance as an important 
factor.  Participants generally were satisfied with Safe Harbor but expressed preferences 
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for programs that provide financial incentives such as government payments, tax breaks, 
or cost sharing.  At the same time, they preferred Safe Harbor over government land 
acquisition, land exchange programs or long-term conservation easements. 
Using the same data, Mehmood and Zhang (2005) compared Safe Harbor 
participants with non-participating landowners and found that landowners owning more 
acres, having a higher perceived risk of woodpeckers nesting on their land, and who had 
consulted a forester were more likely to enroll.  They conclude that larger landowners 
have the most to lose financially and are interested in securing their investment by 
reducing future uncertainty.  Landowners who were less likely to enroll were those who 
expressed concerns about privacy and property rights.  One caveat to these conclusions, 
however, is that their survey response rate from non-participants was extremely low 
(17%) and likely does not provide a representative sample. 
Finally, Zhang and Flick (2001) examined the role of the Endangered Species 
Act and governmental financial incentive programs to influence the reforestation 
behavior of private landowners in and around red-cockaded woodpecker habitat.  They 
found that while regulations lower a landowner’s expectation for future returns on their 
land, government assistance increases expectations.  Landowners are more likely to 
reforest quickly and invest more if governmental programs are available.  In this case, 
cost sharing and technical assistance positively influenced reforestation.   
Another research program focused on endangered species within the Oregon and 
Washington area.  Kline et al. (2000), for example, examined the willingness of private 
forest landowners to adopt harvest restrictions to protect or enhance riparian habitat in 
return for federal income tax deduction.  They found that many private forest 
landowners were motivated to operate their land for reasons other than timber 
production.  Specifically, the more a private forest owner depends on the land for timber 
sales the less willing they are to participate.  This finding was fairly consistent across 
income categories.  Landowners who depend on their land for income require a higher 
economic incentive than landowners who operate their land either for recreational or 
mixed objectives.  Although the paper was framed as benefiting coho salmon restoration, 
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it is unclear whether the researchers actually framed the purpose of the no-harvest buffer 
around riparian areas as a program for the benefit of endangered species or for the 
general ecosystem in the survey instrument. 
Christian Langpap’s research in this same geographic area specifically focuses 
on endangered species-related incentive programs.  Langpap (2004) examined individual 
and land-use factors related to enrolling in an incentive program. He found that 
landowners who are younger, have acquired their property more recently, own more 
woodland, are interested in conservation and providing wildlife habitat on their forests, 
and belong to conservation organizations are more likely to participate in an incentive 
program.  Additionally, it seems that the proportion of woodland was more important 
than actual acres given that the overall acres a landowner owned was negatively related 
to enrollment.  He also found that fear of land restrictions on their property due to the 
ESA was not an important factor in decision making. 
Langpap (2006) then considered the effects of program structure on participation 
by examining the effects of assurances, cost sharing, incentive payments, and technical 
assistance on the probability that private landowners would engage in increasing levels 
of effort to manage their land for endangered species.  Cost sharing provided a weak 
incentive while assurances provided the strongest incentive.  Combining financial 
incentives with assurances, however, markedly increased a landowner’s potential effort 
to manage their land for endangered species.  Technical assistance did not provide any 
substantive incentive.  Finally, in this study, demographic variables, property size, and 
residence were not related to participation or effort. 
Despite the dearth of empirical research on incentive programs related to 
endangered species protection, we are starting to get a picture of their potential use in 
improving endangered species recovery efforts.  I continue this line of investigation by 
considering landowner and land-use characteristics simultaneously with program 
structures in order to improve our understanding of factors that affect private landowner 
cooperation in endangered species recovery.  I specifically look at four structural factors 
landowners may consider when deciding to participate including financial incentives, 
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receiving technical assistance with land management activities, contract length, and their 
obligation to the endangered species after the contract is complete.  In addition, I 
incorporate landowner characteristics to further explain participation. 
METHODS 
To examine the role of program structure on participation in an incentive 
program, I used a stated preference choice model.  Choice models are behavioral models 
that recognize that complex decisions are based on several factors considered 
simultaneously.  Unlike contingent valuation, the choice model does not focus 
exclusively on estimating willingness to pay.  Instead, it asks respondents to identify the 
tradeoffs they are willing to make between different factors within the choice task 
(Boyer and Polasky 2004).  The key here is to obtain useful information on the relative 
ranking of value as it relates to a particular policy.  In this way, it can provide decision 
makers with a predictive understanding how individuals are likely to react to policies 
which could lead to better allocation of resources, increased cost-effectiveness, and 
ultimately improved recovery of endangered species. 
Stated preference choice models assume that individuals behave in ways that 
maximize their utility, their relative satisfaction for a particular alternative. It assumes 
that the part-worth utilities, the proportion of utility that can be attributed to a specific 
attribute (Hensher et al. 2005, p. 703), are integrated cognitively by the respondent and 
that the alternative with the highest overall utility is chosen.  For example, when 
presented with two different incentive program contracts, the choice modeling technique 
assumes that a private landowner will choose the one that makes him or her happiest 
overall.  While the landowner considers all personally-relevant factors during the 
decision-making process a researcher cannot account for all of these factors involved.  
Consequently, choice models are probabilistic, decomposing the utility (Uj) of enrolling 
in a particular incentive program into what a researcher can observe (Vj) for a set of 
program attributes (A) and into other unobserved factors (εj).  This random utility model 
is formally represented as: 
Uj = Vj(A) + εj 
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The choice model presented landowners with a series of six pairs of hypothetical 
performance contracts in which the landowner would “restore and maintain endangered 
species habitat on a portion of [their] land by clearing Ashe juniper (i.e., cedar), 
conducting a prescribed/controlled burn, and setting aside some mature oak-juniper 
woodlands on steep slopes and in canyons.”  Performance contracts are legal instruments 
in which the landowner receives the full benefits once the criteria of the program are 
fully completed.  Landowners in central Texas prefer this type of policy instrument 
(Olenick et al. 2005).  Landowners examined each set of contracts individually and 
selected their preference for contract A, contract B, or for neither contract.  This choice 
serves as the dependent variable in this analysis.  Specifically, I examined whether 
landowners choose a contract or no contract and then simultaneously estimated the 
effects of the program structure and other covariates to understand the choices. 
I examined four program factors landowners may consider when deciding to 
participate including financial incentives, technical assistance, contract length, and their 
obligation to the endangered species on the contract term expires.  These items and their 
levels were determined based on previous research as well as two focus groups.  One 
focus group consisted of persons involved in creating and administrating incentive 
programs.  The second focus group consisted of landowners within the research area. 
The financial incentives consisted of two different attributes.  First, most 
programs provide some level of cost sharing so that the landowner does not bear the full 
costs of active land management. The cost share amount was defined as the percentage 
of land management costs paid for by the program.  It was based on an average 
management cost of $260 per acre determined for similar programs implemented in the 
area (J. Richard Conner, personal communication) and was represented in the choice 
model by levels of 25%, 50%, 75% and 100%.  Some programs also provide an 
incentive payment that serves to offset the opportunity cost of dedicating the land to 
endangered species protection rather than other uses.  The annual payment was defined 
as the yearly incentive payment received by the landowner for each acre enrolled.  The 
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payment levels were based on similar programs in the area and ranged from no incentive 
payment ($0) to $45 per acre in $15 increments.   
Despite the lack of fear regarding land regulation due to the Endangered Species 
Act (Langpap 2004), Langpap (2006) found that assurances against future regulation 
combined with financial incentives increased the probability that a landowner would put 
a high level of effort into conservation.  I defined this attribute as the level of obligation 
a landowner has to the target endangered species after the contract expires in order to 
have assurances against future regulation of their land.  The first level was characterized 
as full obligation.  It represents the Endangered Species Act’s status quo which mandates 
that landowners with endangered species must avoid harming those species until, at 
minimum, they are recovered and delisted.  The second level represents the U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service’s Safe Harbor program which requires that landowners provide 
only for an initial baseline level of endangered species in perpetuity and are not 
obligated to maintain higher-than-baseline levels of endangered species that result from 
beneficial land management.  The final level was defined as no further obligation to the 
species once the contract expires. 
Most programs provide some level of technical assistance to ensure that program 
objectives are met and to facilitate implementation.  As discussed above, technical 
assistance may not be an important factor for landowners.  Because it is provided by 
many programs, including the proof-of-concept recovery credit system project 
implemented at Fort Hood, I included it here.  Four levels of assistance included: no 
technical assistance, assistance only with the management plan, assistance with the 
management plan as well as consultation on implementation, and assistance with the 
management plan as well as full implementation of the plan executed by the program. 
Previous research on landowner preferences in central Texas indicates that 
landowners prefer short-term contracts over long-term ones (Olenick et al. 2005).  While 
I was initially interested in exploring the potential for longer-term contracts, the final 
levels of contract length used here were based on the results of the landowner focus 
group and include 5, 10, 15, and 20 years.  Finally, because these programs are 
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hypothetical in nature, I could include varying levels of expected outcomes for enrolling 
in the program.  Species increase was defined as the expected increase in the target 
endangered species population in the county as a result of improving habitat and was 
delineated by both descriptive and numerical terms: no increase (0%), minor increase 
(about 5%), moderate increase (about 10%), and major increase (about 15%).  Land 
improvement was defined as the average overall increase in grazing capacity, water 
conservation, and wildlife habitat for the entire property as a result of participating in the 
program.  It was defined in a similar manner: no change (0%), minor improvement 
(10%), moderate improvement (20%), and major improvement (30%).  For both of these 
expected outcomes, the levels were determined by experts in the field.   
Incorporating Landowner Characteristics 
I incorporated two background items to explain choice behavior in landowners.   
The importance landowners ascribed to protecting endangered species in Texas was 
measured on a four-point scale from “not important at all” to “very important.”  To 
facilitate modeling, this variable was converted to a dummy variable for landowners who 
ranked importance as moderately or very important. 
Many studies operationalize a landowner’s dependence on their land for income 
using a fairly objective measure of the percent of annual household income derived from 
activities on their property.  I found that this item suffered from a relatively high item-
nonresponse rate (12%).  The measure, based on perceived dependence, involved three 
items measured on a 7-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree.  The three 
items, “My place is an important source of income,” “My place is a business,” and “My 
place is a way to financially provide for my family,” (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.89) were 
used to create four categories of dependence from low to high. 
Sampling 
The population of interest in this study was private landowners around the Fort 
Hood military installation who had potential habitat for the black-capped vireo and the 
golden-cheeked warbler.  To maintain consistency with previous research (i.e., Wilkins 
2004), this study sampled from the population of landowners in three watersheds within 
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all or part of six counties including: Bell, Bosque, Coryell, Hamilton, Lampasas, and 
McLennan County in central Texas.   
I constructed a sampling frame using landowner information obtained from each 
of the six county tax appraisal districts.  For each county, I used GIS to overlay a golden-
cheeked warbler habitat model created by Jones (2006) and selected landowners with a 
moderate to high probability of having golden-cheeked warbler habitat.  I further 
restricted the sampling frame to landowners with at least 10 hectares (25 acres) because 
it is sizeable enough to accommodate a breeding pair (e.g., Anders and Dearborn 2004) 
and it is of interest given the current demographic trend in Texas land ownership toward 
smaller-sized properties (Wilkins, Brown et al. 2003).  Finally, landowner information 
was submitted to a consumer information company and available phone numbers were 
obtained.  This resulted in a sampling frame of 542 landowners. 
Data Collection 
Sampling was stratified by county only to facilitate data collection and the results 
were treated as a random sample.  Because endangered species issues are not salient for 
most landowners (e.g., Brook et al. 2003; Raymond and Olive 2008), the research 
protocol involved four steps.  First, I sent a letter to the landowner’s mailing address 
advising them that I would be calling regarding a project on wildlife conservation.  For 
landowners who agreed to participate, a face-to-face structured interview was conducted 
focusing on land-use and landowner characteristics.  At the end of the 15-minute 
interview, a self-administered questionnaire containing the programmatic items along 
with a thank-you gift of a small watercolor print of a local landscape was left with the 
participant.  To ensure a suitable response rate for the self-administered questionnaire I 
used a rolling reminder procedure based on the Dillman (2000) mail survey technique.  
One week after each round of interviews, I sent a thank you/reminder postcard followed 
3 weeks and 7 weeks later by a reminder letter and replacement questionnaire. 
I administered the choice model to landowners in the self-administered 
questionnaire. Because there were 7 attributes with 3 or 4 levels each, over 12,000 
combinations attributes and their levels were possible.  Generally, respondents can 
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handle only a small number of choice set comparisons (Louviere et al. 2000).  I used a 
fractional factorial experimental design with blocking that resulted in 8 versions of the 
questionnaire with each landowner answering 6 choice sets. 
Data Analysis 
Although the random utility model discussed above provides a conceptual 
framework for analyzing choice behavior, a statistical model is needed to estimate the 
probability that an individual will select a particular program from a set of alternatives as 
well as to estimate the parameter weights for the individual program attributes.  As 
discussed above, the random utility model is formally represented as Uj = Vj(A) + εj.  
The probability that an individual chooses alternative j is the probability that the utility 
of j is greater than the utility of all other alternatives in the choice set, C: 
Prob{Alternative j chosen} = Uj > Ui  where εj≠ εi, ∀i∈ C) 
Now, substituting the observed and random terms for the utilities Uj and Ui 
Prob{Alternative j chosen} = (Vj + εj > Vi + εi) 
and rearranging the terms yields the cumulative probability that the error difference is 
less than the observed quantity: 
Prob{Alternative j chosen} = (εi - εj < Vj - Vi) 
To summarize with an example, the probability of choosing Performance 
Contract A over Performance Contract B is the probability that, when I look at the 
unobserved factors of Contract B compared to Contract A, εB - εA, the person continues 
to choose Contract A as long as the unobserved factors for Contract B do not dominate 
by at least the amount that Contract A dominates on the observed factors (VA – VB). 
The well-known multinomial logit  models choices as a function of the attributes 
of alternatives presented to the landowner (McFadden 1974).  In this model, the 
conditional probability of selecting alternative i over all other alternatives (j) is 
∑
∈
=
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jk
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X
X
)exp(
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Where µ is a scale parameter (which is set to a value of one in this research), C is the 
choice set, and X is a vector of attributes that enter the equation at various levels based 
on the experimental design (Bennett and Blamey 2001).   
The multinomial logit relies solely on the program attributes to explain choice 
behavior and ignores relationship between individual-specific characteristics and choice.  
Thus, this model assumes that all individuals have identical preferences but, empirically, 
this almost never the case (Louviere et al. 2008).  To account for heterogeneity, I 
employed a latent-class choice model to predict enrollment in a hypothetical incentive 
program to protect endangered species on private lands.  The latent-class choice model 
accounts for heterogeneous preferences by assuming that a finite number of classes exist 
in a population and that these classes are characterized by relatively homogenous 
preferences (Birol et al. 2006).  The model further assumes that the researcher does not 
know the class membership of particular individuals; thus, the researcher can only 
determine the probability that any individual belongs to a specific class.  Once classes 
are established, the researcher can then use the multinomial logit form to estimate 
characteristics of an individual that help to explain the probability that an individual 
belongs to a certain class (see Boxall and Adamowicz 2002p; Morey et al. 2006, for 
details on latent choice models). 
The appropriate number of classes typically is identified by the data using either 
the Akaike information criterion (AIC) or Bayesian information criterion (BIC).  Due to 
the smaller sample size, I used a corrected version of the AIC, labeled as AICC, which 
provides stronger protection against overfitting (see Simonoff 2003, pp. 45-46).  As 
Swait (1994) notes, researcher judgment and model interpretability are also key factors 
in model selection.  For each class, the latent-choice model estimates a separate set of 
parameter estimates.  For this data set, I set the level of confidence at α = 0.10.  I used 
effects coding for ordinal attributes (i.e., technical assistance and obligation) and linear 
coding for all other attributes.  I also tested for quadratic effects and interactions. 
The predicted values of the multinomial logit models for each class are the part-
worth utilities, which serve as relative weights for the levels of each attribute.  These 
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part-worth utilities can be transformed into predicted probabilities which, expressed as 
percentages, serve as calculations of relative support for different policy options.  Thus, 
a decision support system (DSS) can be created in which the market share or support for 
one contract over the other can be forecast.  I provide two examples to illustrate how the 
DSS can identify potential tradeoffs landowners are willing to make based on financial 
incentives (cost share and compensation) as well as obligation and contract length.  I 
then examine a number of scenarios to understand changes in support for contracts. 
RESULTS 
I obtained an interview cooperation rate of 45% for landowner interviews 
(American Association for Public Opinion Research 2006).  Of the 245 self-
administered questionnaires left with participants, 214 were returned for a self-
administered survey response rate of 87%.  Three individuals were removed during the 
data analysis because of excessive influence on the model (as measured by standardized 
residuals and Cook’s D values).  Considering missing data, 172 landowners were 
available for this analysis. 
A large proportion of the sample (34%) refused to choose a contract for any of 
the six choice profiles.  This type of nonresponse is considered a protest, where 
respondents rejected the premise or some other aspect of the choice task.  I removed 
these protest respondents from the sample leaving 113 landowners in the final analysis.  
All information criterion indicators suggested that latent classes improved the model 
over the traditional multinomial logit.  Both the AICC and the BIC suggested a two-class 
solution as optimal.  I found this model to fit the data well (ρ2 = 0.4072) and it was easily 
interpreted.   
Table 6 contains the parameter estimates for the two-class model.  Table 6a 
contains the choice model parameters or the utility functions and Table 6b contains the 
class membership model parameters.  The class membership model represents the effects 
of a landowner’s opinion toward help endangered species in central Texas as well as 
their perceived dependence on their land for income on the probability of membership in 
one of the two classes.  Both effects are statistically significant and separate landowners 
77 
 
into one group that is more dependent on their land for income and less concerned with 
protecting endangered species than the average landowner (Class 1, 62% of respondents) 
and another group that is less dependent on their land and more concerned with 
protecting endangered species than the average landowner (Class 2, 38% of 
respondents).   
 
 
 
Table 6. Parameter estimates for a.) the choice model and b.) the class membership model.   
   Class 1 Class 2 
 Model Parameter z-value Parameter z-value 
a. Choice Model     
 Intercept -0.9796 -9.3996 0.7936 5.0738
 Cost Share 0.2389 4.5653 0.2437 4.9445
 Incentive Payment 0.1538 2.7686 0.1389 2.6991
 Technical Assistance     
 None -0.2709 -1.2107 -0.7139 -3.2166
 Plan Only -0.3583 -1.5505 0.0442 0.226
 Plan & Consult 0.4267 2.2321 0.2669 1.3651
 Plan & Implement 0.2026 0.9794 0.4028 2.0018
 Contract Length -0.3536 -6.1319 -0.1876 -3.6828
 Contract Lengthq* 0.5354 4.012 0.0652 0.5943
 Obligation     
 Full -1.6681 -5.3269 -0.2818 -1.5907
 Baseline -0.1176 -0.5981 0.0207 0.1373
 None 1.7857 8.3103 0.2611 1.4383
 Species Increase -0.0135 -0.2567 0.1199 2.5454
 Land Improvement 0.0645 1.2012 0.1609 3.235
b. Membership Model     
 Importance -0.6872 -2.2383 0.6872 2.2383
 Dependence 0.0295 1.7028 -0.0295 -1.7028
 *Quadratic coding used  
 
The parameter estimates for the choice model are presented in Table 6a.  The 
statistically significant negative intercept for Class 1 shows that holding all attributes 
constant, members of this group prefer to not choose a contract. In contrast, with 
everything else held constant, Class 2 prefers to choose a contract over no contract.  
Based on Vermunt and Magidson’s (2005) Wald I statistic, all attributes were 
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statistically significant in both classes indicating that they influenced the landowners’ 
choice of alternatives.  However, the Wald II statistics indicated that not all attributes 
differed significantly between the two classes.  Specifically, the parameters for cost 
share, incentive payment, technical assistance and expected land improvement did not 
differ, indicating relatively homogeneous preferences for the overall sample on these 
attributes.  Both groups preferred increased levels of these attributes.  The segments 
differed significantly on contract length, obligation to the endangered species, and the 
expected effect of enrolling on the species improvement.   
The part-worth utilities in Figure 5 represent the relative preferences of 
landowners and facilitate interpretation.  Landowners in Class 1 were more likely to opt 
out and not choose a contract.   They had increasing preferences for cost share and 
incentive payments.  They expressed a preference for cost share levels around 75% or 
greater, indicating they much prefer the compensation program to pay for land 
management costs.  Similarly, they preferred incentive payments toward the higher end 
of the range.  The level of technical assistance did not factor strongly in their decision 
making as only one level of this attribute was statistically significant.  Landowners in 
Class 1 preferred the program to assist with the management plan and consult on 
implementation.  Landowners strongly preferred a 5-year contract and had a loss in 
preference for longer contracts. This relationship was quadratic indicating that the loss 
occurs at a decreasing rate as the contract length increases.  This group had a strong 
disutility for a full obligation to endangered species and a strong preference for no 
further obligation once the contract expires.  Neither species increase nor land 
improvement factored into landowner decision making in this group.   
Holding everything constant, landowners in Class 2 were more likely to choose a 
contract over no contract.  Their preferences for cost share and incentive payment were 
extremely similar to landowners in Class 1.  This group had a strong negative reaction to 
no technical assistance and preferred a program that assists with the management plan 
and also implements the land management measures.  They also indicated greater 
preference for shorter-term contracts and indicated some preference for 10-year  
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Figure 5. Part-worth utilities for each choice model attribute. 
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contracts.  Landowners in Class 2 did not indicate any significant preference for 
obligation to the species.  The lack of statistical significance indicates that obligation 
probably did not factor into their decision making process.  Unlike landowners in Class 
1, this group showed increasing preference for improving the numbers of species as well 
as their land as a result of enrolling.  Specifically, landowners preferred that the program 
makes moderate and major improvements.   
To understand landowner support for different performance contracts I used the 
decision support system to examine the market share for a number of scenarios.  Figure 
6 shows the percent of landowners who prefer a particular contract over no contract.  
The structure of the first contract is similar to the recovery credit system (RCS) 
performance contract.  While the number of years can vary, current trends for landowner 
enrollment are toward 20 year contracts (N. Wilkins personal communication).  There is 
no incentive payment with the RCS and the program pays for all land management costs 
except the prescribed burn.  Given, however, that the cost share level is well over 75%, I 
use 100% as the base for this program.  The RCS also conducts the brush clearing and 
prescribed burn for the landowner.  It guarantees that landowners have no obligation to 
the endangered species after the contract expires because Texas state law forbids 
disclosure of this information to other agencies or individuals (Texas Parks & Wildlife 
Code 12.0251).  While the expectation attributes are purely hypothetical, I chose to be 
conservative and set the baseline for species and land improvement as minor.  Species 
increase was set to be greater than “none” because I should be able to expect some 
improvement given the “net benefit” requirement of the RCS program.  Additionally, I 
know from previous work that the land management techniques employed for the black-
capped vireo benefit the landowner by restoring and enhancing their rangeland (Olenick 
et al. 2005). 
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Figure 6. Market share for contracts with varying attribute levels.  The underlined text below the x-axis 
highlights which attribute’s level was changed.  Contract 1 represents the RCS contract. 
 
 
The landowners in Class 2 showed strong initial support for the RCS contract 
(92%) over no contract (Figure 5).  Landowners in this group were adverse to 20-year 
contracts but this seemed to be traded off for high cost share levels, technical assistance 
that includes help with implementation, and some benefit to both the species and their 
land.  As the contract is modified Class 2’s support for the contract does not vary much.  
This can be explained by the nonlinear logit model.  If an alternative is extremely good 
to begin with (i.e., support is close to 100%) then changes to the program do not change 
support by much (Train 2003).  The most change in support as attribute levels are varied 
occurs when initial support is close to 50%. 
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Figure 7. Percent change in support for performance contracts with varying levels of incentive payment 
per acre and cost share.  The percent change is relative to the RCS contract which represents 100% cost 
share and a $0 per acre incentive payment. 
 
 
Class 1 shows much more sensitivity to changes in program structure.  As the 
incentive payment increases in Figure 6 (Contracts 2 and 3) and as the contract length is 
decreased (Contract 4), support increases by 20%.  For this group, increased obligation 
to the target species drastically reduced support for the performance contract.  For 
example, in Contract 3 where the contract length is 20 years and there is no obligation, 
support for the contract is 73%.  When the contract length is 5 years and there is a full 
obligation to the species (Contract 7), support decreases by almost one third to 42%.  
This comparison demonstrates that landowners in this group are more sensitive to 
obligation than to contract length. 
The decision support system can also be used to compare preferences for two 
competing contracts and to identify potential tradeoffs landowners are willing to make.  
For example, Figure 7 shows landowner preferences for different levels of financial 
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incentives while controlling for other attributes.  Here, the annual incentive payment per 
acre is nested within the four levels of cost share.  The RCS program is set as the base 
scenario and normalized to zero (as shown by the $0 per acre, 100% cost share level in 
the figure) and all other combinations of financial incentives can be viewed as the 
percent change in support compared to the RCS.  All levels of support greater than or 
equal to zero (i.e., the RCS) indicate a combination of financial incentive attributes that 
can either substitute for or are preferred over the RCS performance contract while 
holding all other attributes constant.  Landowners in both Class 1 and 2 preferred to 
receive 100% cost share as in the RCS but also an additional incentive payment.  
Landowners in both classes also were willing to accept a 75% cost share with either a 
$30 per acre or $45 per acre incentive payment.  Finally, members of Class 1 but not 
Class 2 were almost equally happy with the RCS contract or a 50% cost share and $45 
per acre, holding other attributes constant. 
In a second example, I compare tradeoffs landowners may be willing to make 
with regard to their obligation to the endangered species and the contract length (Figure 
8).  In this case, the RCS performance contract is a 20-year term with no obligation to 
the species once it expires.  Landowners in Class 1 showed a strong preference for no 
obligation.  Five and 10-year contracts with no obligation were preferred over the RCS 
contract.  This group also was willing to accept a baseline level of obligation but only for 
a 5-year contract term.  Landowners in Class 2 were much more willing to support 
alternative contracts because their preference for shorter-term contracts was stronger 
than their preference levels of obligation.  Specifically, Class 2 landowners preferred any 
shorter-term contract with no obligation to the current RCS contract.  Holding other 
attributes constant, they also preferred any 5 or 10-year term with any level of obligation 
over the RCS contract. 
Finally, I compare the best and worst contract for each class as well as a feasible 
contract (Table 7).  The best contracts for each group indicate that almost all landowners 
who did not register a protest vote would choose the performance contract over the 
option of no contract.  The worst contracts show that all landowners in Class 1 would opt 
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out and choose no contract over this contract.  In contrast, almost one quarter (24%) of 
landowners in Class 2 would still select this contract over no contract. 
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Figure 8. Percent change in support for performance contracts with varying levels of obligation and 
contract length.  The percent change is relative to the RCS contract which represents no obligation and a 
20-year contract term. 
 
 
The feasible contract approximates a performance contract similar to the 
Environmental Quality Incentives Program (Knight) in which a landowner in central 
Texas might enroll (J. Richard Conner, personal communication).  The EQIP program 
does not focus on wildlife but can significantly restore and enhance a landowner’s 
rangeland and thus wildlife habitat.  To approximate this, I chose no obligation to the 
target species and also removed the expectation of species improvement.  I do recognize 
that the choice model overall was framed as a program to enhance and maintain 
endangered species habitat.  The point here is to examine a program structure for 
endangered species habitat management that is similar to EQIP.  Overall, there was a 
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high level of support for this contract despite the modest financial incentives.  This helps 
to further see the large influence of contract length and obligation in the choice model. 
DISCUSSION 
Conservation programs that compensate private landowners for land 
management practices that benefit imperiled species are effective only insofar as 
landowners cooperate.  To date, the role of program structure in encouraging 
participation has not been discussed in the literature.  Previous research focuses almost 
exclusively on the relationship between landowner and land-use characteristics and 
participation in a given program (Kraft et al. 1996; Nagubadi et al. 1996; Kline et al. 
2000; Langpap 2004; Mehmood and Zhang 2005; Zhang and Flick 2001; Zhang and 
Mehmood 2002).  Langpap (2006) is the first work I am aware of that actually examines 
the underlying structure of the conservation program and my work adds to this line of 
research.  Using a latent choice approach I illustrate the principle that there is no such 
thing as an average landowner.  This data essentially identified three distinct segments.  
One group of landowners was the protest respondents (33% of the sample).  While I 
didn’t measure the reason for their nonresponse, one explanation could be a general 
disinterest in government assistance.  Landowners tend to be highly independent 
(Peterson and Horton 1995) and may not be interested in government compensation 
programs in general (e.g., Kraft et al. 1996).   
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A second group did participate in the choice task but was more likely to opt out 
rather than choose a contract (41% of the sample).  This group was highly sensitive to 
the obligation attribute indicating that their preferences were driven by endangered 
species concerns.  Thus, in addition to an overall disinterest in conservation programs, 
those programs targeted toward endangered species may face yet another hurdle for a 
significant proportion of landowners.  The third group was predisposed to choose a 
contract (26% of the sample). Even in the worst-case scenario, almost one quarter of the 
landowners in this group were still willing to cooperate.  Obligation to the endangered 
species was less of an issue than cost share and contract length.  Overall, almost three 
quarters of the landowners in the sample were either not willing to consider a 
conservation program or were more likely to opt out.  Given the differences in 
landowners, interpreting average-based results may mislead decision makers.  For 
example, if I had assumed landowners have identical preferences, program designers 
likely would be left wondering why enrollment was lower than expected. 
As discussed in Chapter II, socio-demographic information by itself generally is 
not useful in predicting specific behavior (see also Langpap 2006).  I did find some 
evidence that perceived dependence on land for income might be useful as a proxy for 
landowner characteristics because perceived dependence provides insight into how a 
landowner thinks about or operates the land.  In Chapter II, I found that landowners with 
higher incomes, more education, who operate their land for the enjoyment of doing so, 
are less rooted to the community where their land is located, and who are less likely to 
identify themselves as a rancher were less dependent on their land for income.  For this 
data, dependence on land for income was useful in discriminating between members of 
each latent class and adds support for this construct.  Additionally, decreased 
dependence was related to increased importance for protecting endangered species 
similar to Brook et al. (2003).  This lends support for the work of Kline et al. (2000) who 
found that landowner participation in programs was related to their land-use motivations. 
The results show that landowners concentrated more on the program structure 
and less on the expected outcomes of participation.  This should serve as an alert to 
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agencies who design conservation programs.  While landowners may have expectations, 
these potential outcomes are diminished by the parameters of the program itself.  Thus, 
landowners’ preferences for program fit seem to be more important than expected 
program outcomes indicate that designers cannot simply create a program who high 
potential for land benefits and expect landowners to enroll. 
Identifying heterogeneity in landowner preferences also has implications for the 
design of conservation programs.  Programs designed with the average landowner in 
mind, or that use a broad-brush approach likely are not achieving optimal levels of 
conservation on private lands.  I argue that programs can find efficiencies as well as 
increase efficacy by considering that landowners vary in their orientation to their land, to 
compensation programs in general, and to endangered species.  The voluntary nature of 
conservation programs makes them more like consumer goods.  Landowners can 
examine various programs based on their objectives, the program structure, and the 
expected outcomes of enrolling.  Then, they can choose one that best fits them.  Thus, it 
is in the best interest of the conservation field to identify landowner segments and design 
products with these groups in mind.   For example, this research may suggest that a 
graduated program in which the contract length and the level of incentive payment are 
inversely graded to the percent of a landowner’s income derived from activities on their 
land may be a flexible approach to appeal to a wider array of landowners. 
I can reexamine Langpap’s (2006) findings considering this heterogeneity.  His 
finding that landowners concerns about restrictions on timber harvesting and land 
development did not influence their participation in a conservation program is supported 
by this data (i.e., landowners in Class 2; also see Chapter II).  I also found a large 
proportion of landowners for whom obligations are a concern.  It is important to note, 
however, that the attribute was framed differently between studies and this could affect 
responses (Kahneman et al. 1991).   Lanpap framed the issue as receiving assurances 
while I framed it as an obligation to the species in order to receive assurances.  While 
Langpap (2006) found that cost share provided the weakest incentive to landowners, I 
found cost-share levels to be at least as important compensation, especially for 
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landowners in Class 2.  A reasonable explanation for this may be that landowners who 
are less dependent on their land devote less time to operating their land and are more 
open to receiving assistance.  Additionally, prioritizing cost share over compensation 
may indicate that program choice is more about improving the land or helping the 
species than receiving compensation for opportunity costs for this group.  These ideas 
are supported by the fact that landowners in Class 2 thought protecting endangered 
species in central Texas was more important than landowners in Class 1; landowners in 
Class 2 were more likely to choose a program that helped the target species; and, 
landowners in Class 2 preferred programs that improved their own land. 
Finally, a limitation is worth noting is that this method assumes landowners make 
choices based on the principle of utility maximization.  This assumption is part of 
mainstream economics and policy analysis approaches and does not hold under 
experimental conditions.  Newer approaches that incorporate ideas of bounded 
rationality, framing, and that use deliberative processes to improve the link between 
preferences and behavior increasingly have been incorporated into research 
(Venkatachalam 2008).  Even with these improving methods, the rational choice 
approach can be useful in predicting behavior.  This is especially true regarding 
behaviors that are purely voluntary, like choices on what to do with your private 
property.  Research incorporating both stated and revealed preferences has demonstrated 
the predictive validity of this approach (e.g., Adamowicz et al. 1997; Earnhart 2001; 
Haener et al. 2001).   
CONCLUSION 
In central Texas, there is no average landowner; they are not a single 
homogeneous group.  Based on their responses to the hypothetical performance 
contracts, the latent choice model identified two groups that responded differently to 
program structures.  These groups can be delineated by their opinion on endangered 
species protection and their perceived dependence on their land for income.  Landowners 
who were more dependent on their land and afforded less importance to endangered 
species protection were less likely to consider compensation programs related to 
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endangered species, and were more sensitive to the structure of a compensation program.  
Less dependent landowners who gave more importance to endangered species protection 
were more willing to enroll in a compensation program and their support for different 
performance contract was less sensitive to program structure. 
This paper illustrates how a stated preference choice model can help decision 
makers design incentive programs for landowners by providing information about the 
acceptability of program structure.  The prospects for gaining landowner cooperation in 
endangered species recovery around Fort Hood are not entirely encouraging.  This 
research emphasizes identifying tradeoffs and allows for the development of a 
forecasting model, the decision support system that provides a means of estimating 
potential support for varying configurations of performance contracts. By considering 
the different types of landowners, program designers can increase prospects for 
landowner cooperation, enhance participation and thus improve the efficacy of 
endangered species recovery on working lands in central Texas.   
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
Although the predominant human-related cause of the current loss of biodiversity 
is land conversion, the conservation field increasingly recognizes the opportunity to 
engage working lands in conservation efforts.  As previously discussed, major 
ecosystems of the U.S. are not adequately represented in our parks and protected areas 
and most imperiled wildlife species use or rely on habitat provided by private 
landowners.  Michael Rosenzweig (2003), for example, illustrates the limitations of 
preservation and restoration strategies and calls for what he labels a “reconciliation 
ecology” approach that works in concert with these two dominant strategies to conserve 
species from within human-dominated landscapes.  Furthermore, while land converted 
into working lands is condemned as the problem, empirical evidence supports a general 
shift from a bias in the conservation field that favors a traditional research emphasis on 
pristine ecosystems (Tscharntke et al. 2005) to one that recognizes the potential to 
improve conservation from within the working landscape. 
The idea that working lands should be incorporated into efforts to protect and 
sustain biodiversity is not new.  The Endangered Species Act passed in 1973 recognizes 
the problem of land conversion in its purpose statement (16 U.S.C. 1531 §2(a)(1)): 
“Various species of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United States have been rendered 
extinct as a consequence of economic growth and development untempered by adequate 
concern and conservation” (emphasis added).  It mandates prevention of extinction 
above all other social goals (Mann and Plummer 1995; Yaffee 1982) and this, along with 
a historically heavy-handed approach to implementation, led to a dilemma in which 
landowners perceive it in their best interest not to manage their land to benefit 
endangered species (see Lueck and Michael 2003).  Because private landowners have 
the right to refuse government access to their land the ESA has found its success in 
dealing with endangered species on federal lands (Norris 2004).   
What is new, or at least newer, is the recognition that regulation and enforcement 
is not an effective strategy for protecting endangered species on private lands.  
92 
 
Compensation programs recognize the perverse incentive structure and the need to 
rearrange incentives in a way that offset costs or enhance benefits to the cooperating 
landowner.  Given this increasing recognition, improving conservation on private 
working lands will be successful inasmuch as landowners want to voluntarily cooperate 
with conservation goals.  My research investigated the potential for landowners in 
central Texas to participate in a compensation program to protect two endangered bird 
species.  I examined their willingness to enroll in cost-sharing performance contracts by 
assessing landowner characteristics including behavioral, attitudinal, and normative 
factors as well as preferences for program-related attributes. 
CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE 
While a number of studies have been conducted on conservation-related 
compensation programs (see Chapter I), they mostly have focused on landowner and 
land-related characteristics associated with actual or hypothetical enrollment.  Myriad 
factors have been identified as being systematically related to enrollment including age, 
education, membership in conservation or forestry organization, political attitudes, 
attitudes toward endangered species, interaction with or trust in agencies and their 
personnel, property rights orientations, motivation for land use, perceived risk of 
regulation, years of ownership, acres owned, on-site residence, owning vs. leasing land, 
income derived from land, among others (Kline et al. 2000; Kraft et al. 1996; Langpap 
2004; Mehmood and Zhang 2005; Nagubadi et al. 1996; Zhang and Flick 2001; Zhang 
and Mehmood 2002).  The inferences that can be drawn from these studies, however, are 
limited.  In some studies age is important and in others it is not.  Interacting with an 
agency or forester may positively (e.g., Kraft et al. 1996) or negatively (e.g., Nagubadi et 
al. 1996) influence participation.  Some research indicates that fear of government 
control is a constraint to enrollment (e.g., Smith et al. 2007) while others claim it is not a 
factor at all (e.g. Langpap 2004). 
The mixed outcomes do little to paint a clearer picture of landowners who do or 
do not enroll in conservation programs.  This is not surprising.  Back in 1980, Icek Ajzen 
and Martin Fishbein proffered a theory of behavior that relegated these types of 
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characteristics as theoretically unimportant.  That is, these items are at best indirectly 
related to behavior. For example, education does not directly affect enrollment in a 
conservation program.  It may affect salient beliefs about the outcomes of participating 
in a program which could then affect attitude toward enrolling and ultimately influence 
behavior.  Items that are more closely related to behavior (e.g., past behavior, attitude 
toward a behavior, etc.) are much better at predicting actual behavior.  In this example, 
as one moves from education, an external variable, to beliefs, to attitude, predictive 
ability increases.  Thus, “there is no necessary relation between any external variable and 
a given behavior” (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980, p.85).  When relationships between so-
called external variables (e.g., education) and behavior are detected, it is generally a 
sample-specific finding and does not necessarily hold in other settings, other contexts or 
other time periods. 
My research illustrates this idea well.  In Chapter II, external variables were not 
related to intention to enroll in the performance contract.  As I added expected outcomes 
of enrolling, past behavior, and other behavioral intentions, the ability of the model to 
predict intention improved.  In Chapter III I applied Ajzen and Fishbein’s (1980) theory 
of reasoned action and found that it predicted intention quite well.  One could expect to 
use the same model in a different location, at a different time and prediction would still 
be high.  This is because the theory of reasoned action is delimited in such a way that, 
like other useful theories, transcends time and space. 
Because constructs that are more closely related to behavior are better at 
predicting behavior, I incorporated past behavior and ancillary behavioral intentions.  
These worked well and also helped to identify landowners who may or may not enroll in 
a more robust way than expected if I had relied on external variables.  This same 
approach could be taken into other settings and used to further understand behavioral 
intentions toward a multi-attribute item.  Overall, work in this area needs to apply 
behavioral theory not just to predict behavior but to explain it.  Continued attention to 
landowner and land characteristics will never provide the level of insight needed to 
understand participation across contexts and optimize conservation on working lands. 
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The literature on conservation programs also generally fails to account for the 
idea that participation can be influenced by the structure of the program (but see 
Langpap 2006, for an exception).  Most empirical studies focus solely on the relationship 
between landowner characteristics and participation in a given program. In Chapter IV I 
address this dearth of research by examining preferences for the structure of a 
conservation program.  My work goes beyond that of Langpap (2006) because I account 
for the heterogeneous preferences of landowners.  Using a latent class approach, I 
identified specific attributes (e.g., obligation to the endangered species) on which 
landowner segments differ while at the same time providing some insight into the 
characteristic differences between the groups. 
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSERVATION PROGRAMS 
Because conservation programs are voluntary, they rely on landowners knowing 
about the program, identifying the benefits of enrolling, and then making the decision to 
enroll.  In this way, they are like a consumer good.  Landowners can use organizations 
such the Texas Land Trust Council (http://www.texaslandtrustcouncil.org) to essentially 
shop for a conservation program that meets their needs and desires.  Tools such as 
conservation easements, where landowners directly negotiate the terms of the easement, 
likely are popular because of their flexibility and ability to be customized.  For 
conservation programs that will be created and bound to an underlying structure, it 
makes sense to segment the market in order to create a product that has a broad appeal.  
Considering the heterogeneous preferences of landowners during the design phase can 
result in conservation programs that have wider appeal and that are therefore more 
effective in engaging working land in conservation efforts. 
Lessons 
The first lesson this research provides is that, although it is popular to do so, 
using landowner characteristics is an inefficient means of segmenting landowners.  
Characteristics such as land size, age, education, absentee landowner, years property 
owned, etc. may be related to general attitudes toward endangered species or 
conservation programs but have little ability to predict participation in a specific 
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program.  This is not a new finding but bears repeating because many studies still use 
this approach to try to understand and predict behavior. 
The second lesson is that while theoretical frameworks such as reasoned action 
are well-suited to predict behavior under certain circumstances, they are not entirely 
useful to program managers.  It is not surprising to find that landowners with positive 
beliefs and attitudes toward enrolling in a program are more likely to express an 
intention to enroll.  For program managers, it is finding those landowners that is the key 
to enhancing endangered species recovery efforts.  I found that behavioral predictors can 
improve understanding of who are these landowners with positive attitudes.  For 
example, landowners who recently have cleared brush on their land tend to have more 
positive attitudes along with landowners who are interested in conservation programs 
that focus on clearing brush. 
The third lesson is that conservation programs must strongly consider the 
heterogeneous preferences of landowners when designing programs.  While all 
landowners prefer strong financial incentives they do not only focus on the money.  
They consider other payoffs such as future obligations and potential outcomes.  The 
reason I make a normative statement here is that conservation programs focusing on 
endangered species provide a social good, biodiversity.  Incorporating the differing 
needs of landowners is a way to improve participation and thus enhance recovery efforts 
in a more cost-effective manner. 
Values 
A currently popular technique in human dimensions work is to measure held 
values and examine their relationship to attitudes and behavior.  Dunlap et al. (2000) use 
the new ecological paradigm (NEP) to understand people’s so-called primitive beliefs 
about the environment.  Fulton et al. (1996) use the cognitive hierarchy to create a scale 
to measure the value orientations of people toward wildlife along a protection-use and 
appreciation orientation.  Paul Stern and his colleagues focus on three types of values to 
explain the phenomenon of environmentalism including self-interest, humanistic 
altruism, and biospheric altruism (e.g., Dietz et al. 2005).  This research is fairly 
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consistent in identifying people who are more concerned about the environment and 
more likely to engage in pro-environmental behaviors.  For example, Dunlap et al.’s 
NEP scale is positively correlated with perceived seriousness of environmental 
problems, pro-environmental policies, and self-reported pro-environmental behaviors.  
Stern’s work with his colleagues consistently finds that the biospheric altruism, which 
measures concern for species or ecosystems beyond the benefit they provide to humans, 
is most strongly related to a pro-environment orientation. 
I did not measure environmental values in this research because values are very 
broad beliefs and do not perform well in predicting behavior (see Hrubes et al. 2001 for 
an example).  However, the results of my research indirectly identify the utilitarian 
values of landowners in central Texas.  In Chapter II, I found that the expected outcome 
of land improvement was important to landowners while helping endangered species 
was marginally important in the beliefs-only model (see Table 3, Model 1).  In the 
second analysis, land management techniques that fit with landowner needs helped to 
predict intentions to enroll.  In the third analysis, dependence on land was a 
discriminating factor in understanding preferences for program structure.  In this case, 
expected land improvement was only an important factor for one subgroup.  However, 
this does not necessarily mean that land improvement was not important.  It may simply 
mean that land improvement played less of a role in the choice process when other 
program features were considered jointly.  If I were to explore the held values of 
landowners, I would hypothesize that Group 2 in the third study would exhibit higher 
appreciation values (Fulton et al. 2000) and stronger biocentric altruism values (Dietz et 
al. 2005) than the landowners in Group 1 who were more dependent on their land.  An 
indirect lesson here for conservation programs might be to focus on the direct benefits of 
conservation programs that coincide with a landowner’s land management goals.  
However, a values-basis reasoning for landowner preferences warrants direct study. 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
My dissertation offers a number of ideas for further investigation of the same 
data as well as for future research.  First, I will heed some of my own advice and 
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incorporate the theory of reasoned action with preferences for program structure to 
obtain a clearer picture of why some landowners refused to engage in the choice task and 
to better explain the reasons behind the preferences of those who did engage in the task.  
That is, while the choice model can only account for those who participated in the choice 
task, I can apply the theory of reasoned action to explain differences between choosers 
and non-choosers and then to understand the preferences of choosers.  As discussed by 
Bernath and Roschewitz (2008), incorporating psychological factors into economic 
models can increase the explained variance. 
As I discuss in Chapter IV, there is no such thing as an average landowner.  This 
same idea of preference heterogeneity can be used to segment landowner to obtain an 
improved picture of intention to enroll in a conservation program using the theory of 
reasoned action. 
This research has also led to me to ask further questions about landowners.  First, 
I’m interested the stewardship construct.  In the literature and in my work (see page 26 
and 29) landowners strongly self-identify as stewards.  Paradoxically, landowners do not 
manage their land for imperiled species or many other nongame species.  Thus, differing 
worldviews seem to exist on what exactly stewardship entails.  Landowners may limit 
the stewardship idea to healthy rangeland as it applies to their intended uses for it (e.g., 
cultivation, livestock, recreation, etc.).  I think some exploratory research using a 
technique like cultural domain analysis to compare worldviews of landowners and 
program designers is warranted here. 
Exploring the potentially different worldviews between landowners and those 
designing conservation programs for biodiversity can help bridge the gap and improve 
participation in conservation programs.  Additionally, improved approaches to 
understanding the link between preferences and choice behavior are needed.  In this 
study, a fairly large proportion of landowners did not participate in the choice task.  I 
have come to believe that a better general understanding of landowner willingness to 
participate in a conservation program needs to be investigated more closely.  For 
example, Smith et al. (2007) surveyed landowners at a agricultural producers 
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conferences in Kansas and found that 97% of those interviewed were familiar with the 
USDA Conservation Reserve Program but that only 45% had participated.  Additionally, 
81% were familiar with the USDA Environmental Quality Incentives Program and just 
under 31% had participated.  Because this data was collected at a meeting of producers 
(and does not include producers that do not participate), I suspect that these numbers 
represent upper bounds of participation.  Fundamental underlying issues including the 
endowment effect and status-quo bias can provide further insight on how to design, 
implement, and recruit landowners so that conservation behavior occurs at higher levels.  
The status-quo bias postulates that individuals have a strong tendency to remain at the 
status quo because the disadvantages of changing loom larger than the potential 
advantages (Kahneman et al. 1991).  The endowment effect is a phenomenon where an 
individual demands more to give up an object than he or she would be willing to pay for 
the object.   
I also appreciate new approaches to measuring preferences that assume that 
people do not a priori have well-formed attitudes or preferences.  Alternative 
approaches, for example, that use the social process of valuation (i.e., participatory and 
deliberative processes) have been increasingly used (Spash et al. 2005; Lynam et al. 
2007).  This hybrid economic and political approach is intriguing and represents the next 
generation of valuation approaches. 
Finally, one staid critique of incentive programs is that they reward behavior that 
landowners should be doing anyway (Raymond 2006; Raymond and Olive 2008).  I 
previously argued that compensation programs related to endangered species are simply 
correcting an incentive problem that existed and was exacerbated by the historical 
implementation of the Endangered Species Act.  Thus, they are not rewards but simply 
fixes to correct a perverse incentive structure.  This criticism, however, raises an 
important issue.  As research on the influence extrinsic incentives on behavior shows, 
rewards change the fundamental motivation for engaging in a target behavior (e.g., Kohn 
1993; Pierce et al. 2003).  Individuals who act solely for the reward (i.e., an extrinsic 
motivation) have a much higher probability of not continuing the behavior once the 
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incentive is removed.  Those who engage in a behavior because of an intrinsic 
motivation are much more likely to continue that behavior with or without rewards.  
Although I argue that incentive programs for endangered species protection are not 
rewards, landowners engaging in them may view them as such and enroll because of an 
extrinsic motivation to obtain the “reward.”  It is my opinion that the ultimate goal of the 
conservation program should be to create an internal norm of conservation behavior on 
an intergenerational scale.  Society should help with the costs because of the positive 
externalities.  Thus, I would like to engage in theory development that synthesizes what 
we know about collective action and cooperation from experimental social psychology 
and case studies as it applies to conservation on private lands.  The research question of 
interest to me is how programs can be designed and implemented in a manner that 
appeals to and reinforces the intrinsic motivation of landowners.  This research can be 
applied to endangered species, biodiversity, as well as ecosystem services. 
CONCLUSION 
I found that landowner interest in compensation programs appears to be moderate 
at best (Chapters II and IV).  For those who are willing to consider programs involving 
endangered species, dovetailing the land management requirements for the species with 
direct benefits to the landowner is important (Chapters II and III) but perhaps not as 
important as ensuring that the program provides adequate financial incentives, 
consideration of the term of the program, and a level of certainty regarding the 
landowner’s future obligation to the target species (Chapter IV).  Finally, landowners are 
not a single homogenous group.  Segmenting landowners using socio-demographic 
variables for the purpose of program design and recruitment will not result in optimal 
levels of conservation. 
Although flawed in many respects (Goble et al. 2006; Mann and Plummer 1995; 
Norris 2004; Yaffee 1982), the Endangered Species Act of 1973 is the primary policy 
tool for protecting biodiversity in the United States.  One major lesson derived from its 
implementation over the past 30 years is that direct regulation is not the only nor the 
optimal way to protect endangered species on private lands because it imposes an undue 
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cost on the affected landowner.  The role of the conservation program is to rearrange the 
incentives so that society bears the cost for something for which it obtains the benefits.  
This recognition has resulted in tools that are much more flexible and that rely on 
cooperation more so than coercion.  At its core, however, the issue is a social dilemma 
and improving endangered species protection on private lands requires an 
interdisciplinary effort from social psychologists, economists, and political scientists 
improving our understanding of conditions under which collective action occurs. 
 
101 
 
REFERENCES 
Abell, P. 2000. Sociological theory and rational choice theory. In The Blackwell 
companion to social theory, ed. B. S. Turner. Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishing. 
Adamowicz, W., P. Boxall, M. Williams, and J. Louviere. 1998. Stated preferences 
approaches for measuring passive use values: Choice experiments and contingent 
valuation. Am J Agric Econ 80(1):64-75. 
Adamowicz, W., J. Swait, P. Boxall, J. Louviere, and M. Williams. 1997. Perceptions 
versus Objective Measures of Environmental Quality in Combined Revealed and 
Stated Preference Models of Environmental Valuation. Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management 32(1):65-84. 
Ajzen, I. 1991. The theory of planned behavior. Organizational behavior and human 
decision processes 50:179-211. 
———. 2002a. Perceived behavioral control, self-efficacy, locus of control, and the 
theory of planned behavior. Journal of Applied Social Psychology 32:1-20. 
———. 2002b. Residual effects of past on later behavior: Habituation and reasoned 
action perspectives. Personality & Social Psychology Review 6:107-122. 
———. 2006. Constructing a TPB questionnaire: Conceptual and methodological 
considerations  [Online], January 2006 2002 [cited October 25 2006]. Available 
from http://www-unix.oit.umass.edu/~aizen/pdf/tpb.measurement.pdf. 
Ajzen, I., and B. L. Driver. 1991. Prediction of leisure participation from behavioral, 
normative, and control beliefs: An application of the theory of planned behavior. 
Leisure Sciences 13:185-204. 
Ajzen, I., and M. Fishbein. 1980. Understanding attitudes and predicting social 
behavior. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
———. 2005. The influence of attitudes on behavior. In The handbook of attitudes, ed. 
D. Albarracín, B. T. Johnson and M. P. Zanna. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
102 
 
Ajzen, I., and T. J. Madden. 1986. Prediction of goal-directed behavior: Attitudes, 
intentions, and perceived behavioral control. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology 22:453-474. 
Allison, P. D. 2002. Missing data. ed. M. S. Lewis-Beck. Vol. 136, Quantitative 
applications in the social sciences. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
American Association for Public Opinion Research. 2006. Standard definitions: Final 
dispositions of case codes and outcome rates for surveys. 4th edn. Lenexa, KS: 
AAPOR. 
Anders, A. D., and D. C. Dearborn. 2004. Population trends of the endangered golden-
cheeked warbler on Fort Hood, Texas, from 1992-2001. Southwest Nat 49:39-47. 
Armitage, C. J., and M. Conner. 2001. Efficacy of the theory of planned behaviour: A 
meta-analytic review. British Journal of Social Psychology 40(4):471. 
Arnold, K. A., C. L. Coldren, and M. L. Fink. 1996. The interactions between avian 
predators and golden-cheeked warblers in Travis County, Texas. College Station, 
TX: Texas Transportation Institute. 
Bauer, D. M., N. E. Cyr, and S. K. Swallow. 2004. Public preferences for compensatory 
mitigation of salt marsh losses: A contingent choice of alternatives. Conserv Biol 
18(2):401-411. 
Bean, M. J. 1998. The endangered species act and private land: Four lessons learned 
from the past quarter century. Environmental Law Reporter 28:10701-10710. 
Ben-Akiva, M., and S. R. Lerman. 1985. Discrete choice analysis: Theory and 
application to travel demand. Cambridge, UK: MIT Press. 
Bennett, J., and R. Blamey. 2001. The Choice modelling approach to environmental 
valuation. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. 
Bernath, K., and A. Roschewitz. 2008. Recreational benefits of urban forests: Explaining 
visitors' willingness to pay in the context of the theory of planned behavior. J 
Environ Manag 89(3):155-166. 
103 
 
Birol, E., K. Karousakis, and P. Koundouri. 2006. Using a choice experiment to account 
for preference heterogeneity in wetland attributes: The case of Cheimaditida 
wetland in Greece. Ecological Economics 60(1):145-156. 
Bliss, J. C., and A. J. Martin. 1989. Identifying NIPF management motivations with 
qualitative methods. For Sci 35(2):601-622. 
Boice, L. P. 2006. Defense and conservation: Compatible missions. Endangered Species 
Bulletin 31(2):4-7. 
Boxall, P. C., and W. L. Adamowicz. 2002. Understanding heterogeneous preferences in 
random utility models: A latent class approach. Environmental and Resource 
Economics 23(4):421-446. 
Boxall, P. C., and B. Macnab. 2000. Exploring the preferences of wildlife recreationists 
for features of boreal forest management: A choice experiment approach. 
Canadian Journal of Forest Resources 30:1931-1941. 
Boyer, T., and S. Polasky. 2004. Valuing urban wetlands: A review of non-market 
valuation studies. Wetlands 24(4):744-755. 
Bright, A. D., M. J. Manfredo, and A. Bath. 1993. Application of the Theory of 
Reasoned Action to the National Park Service's Controlled Burn Policy. Journal 
of Leisure Research 25(3):263-280. 
Brook, A., M. Zint, and R. De Young. 2003. Landowners' responses to an Endangered 
Species Act listing and implications for encouraging conservation. Conserv Biol 
17(6):1638-1649. 
Bullock, S. D., and S. R. Lawson. 2008. Managing the "Commons" on Cadillac 
Mountain: A Stated Choice Analysis of Acadia National Park Visitors' 
Preferences. Leisure Sciences 30(1):71 - 86. 
Casey, J. F., J. R. Kahn, and A. A. F. Rivas. 2008. Willingness to accept compensation 
for the environmental risks of oil transport on the Amazon: A choice modeling 
experiment. Ecological Economics 67(4):552-559. 
Cearly-Sanders, J. 2005. Relationships among landowner and land ownership 
characteristics and participation in conservation programs in central Texas. M.S., 
104 
 
Department of Wildlife and Fisheries Sciences, Texas A&M University, College 
Station. 
Clark, T. W. 1997. Averting extinction: Reconstructing endangered species recovery. 
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Cloud, T. J. 2005. Biological opinion on the proposed revision of the endangered species 
management plan at Fort Hood Military Installation. Arlington, TX: U.S. Fish & 
Wildlife Service. 
Coldren, C. L. 1998. The effects of habitat fragmentation on the golden-cheeked 
warbler. Ph.D., Department of Wildlife and Fisheries Sciences, Texas A&M 
University, College Station, TX. 
Courville, T., and B. Thompson. 2001. Use of structure coefficients in published 
multiple regression articles: B is not enough. Educational And Psychological 
Measurement 61(2):229-248. 
Dietz, T., A. Fitzgerald, and R. Shwom. 2005. Environmental values. Annual Review of 
Environment and Resources 30(1):335-372. 
Dillman, D. A. 2000. Mail and internet surveys: The tailored design method. 2nd edn. 
New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Dirzo, R., and P. H. Raven. 2003. Global state of biodiversity and loss. Annual Review of 
Environment and Resources 28:137-167. 
Dunlap, R. E., K. D. Van Liere, A. G. Mertig, and R. E. Jones. 2000. New trends in 
measuring environmental attitudes: Measuring endorsement of the New 
Ecological Paradigm: A Revised NEP Scale. J Social Issues 56(3):425-442. 
Eagly, A. H., and S. Chaiken. 1993. The psychology of attitudes. Belmont, CA: 
Thomson/Wadsworth. 
Earnhart, D. 2001. Combining revealed and stated preference methods to value 
environmental amenities at residential locations. Land Economics 77(1):12-29. 
Firbank, L. G. 2005. Striking a new balance between agricultural production and 
biodiversity. Ann Appl Biol 146(2):163-175. 
105 
 
Fishbein, M., and I. Ajzen. 1975. Belief, attitude, intention, and behavior : An 
introduction to theory and research. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Fulton, D., K. Nelson, D. Anderson, and D. Lime. 2000. Human dimensions of natural 
resource management: emerging issues and practical applications: Minneapolis, 
MN: Minnesota Cooperative Fish and Wildlife Research Unit Department of 
Fisheries and Wildlife. 
Fulton, D. C., M. J. Manfredo, and J. Lipscomb. 1996. Wildlife value orientations: A 
conceptual and measurement approach. Human Dimensions of Wildlife 1(2):24-
47. 
GAO. 1995. Endangered species act: Information on species protection on nonfederal 
lands. Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office. 
Ginn, W. J. 2005. Investing in nature: Case studies of land conservation in collaboration 
with business. Washington DC: Island Press. 
Goble, D. D., J. M. Scott, and F. W. Davis. 2006. The endangered species act at thirty. 
Washington DC: Island Press. 
Hadlock, T. D., and J. A. Beckwith. 2002. Providing incentives for endangered species 
recovery. Human Dimensions of Wildlife 7(3):197-213. 
Haener, M. K., P. C. Boxall, and W. L. Adamowicz. 2001. Modeling recreation site 
choice: Do hypothetical choices reflect actual behavior? Am J Agric Econ:629-
42. 
Hall, H. D. 2008. Endangered and threatened wildlife and plants: Recovery crediting 
Guidance. Federal Register 73(148):44761-44772. 
Hearne, R. R., and Z. M. Salinas. 2002. The use of choice experiments in the analysis of 
tourist preferences for ecotourism development in Costa Rica. J Environ Manag 
65(2):153-163. 
Hensher, D. A., J. M. Rose, and W. H. Greene. 2005. Applied choice analysis: A primer. 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Housein, J. 2006. Compatible land use partnerships. Endangered Species Bulletin 
31(2):4-7. 
106 
 
Hrubes, D., I. Ajzen, and J. Daigle. 2001. Predicting hunting intentions and behavior: An 
application of the theory of planned behavior. Leisure Sciences 23(3):165-178. 
Hunt, L. M., W. Haider, and B. Bottan. 2005. Accounting for varying setting preferences 
among moose hunters. Leisure Sciences 27:297-314. 
Jackson-Smith, D., U. Kreuter, and R. S. Krannich. 2005. Understanding the 
multidimensionality of property rights orientations: Evidence from Utah and 
Texas ranchers. Society & Natural Resources 18(7):587-610. 
Jones, J. S. 2006. Development of a decision support geographic information system for 
land restoration programs in the Leon, Lampasas, and Bosque river watersheds. 
M.S., Department of Rangeland Ecology and Mangement, Texas A&M 
University, College Station, TX. 
Jones, R. E. 1990. Understanding paper recycling in an institutionally supportive setting: 
An application of the theory of reasoned action. J Environ Syst 19:307-321. 
Jones, R. E., and R. E. Dunlap. 1992. The social bases of environmental concern: Have 
they changed over time? Rural Sociology 57(1):28-47. 
Kahneman, D., J. L. Knetsch, and R. H. Thaler. 1991. Anomalies: The endowment 
effect, loss aversion, and status quo bias. Journal of Economic Perspectives 
5(1):193-206. 
Kellert, S. R. 1994. A sociological perspective: Valuational, socioeconomic, and 
organizational factors. In Endangered species recovery: Finding the lessons, 
improving the process, ed. T. W. Clark, R. P. Reading and A. L. Clarke. 
Washington DC: Island Press. 
———. 1996. The value of life: Biological diversity and human society. Washington 
DC: Island Press. 
Kline, J. D., R. J. Alig, and R. L. Johnson. 2000. Forest owner incentives to protect 
riparian habitat. Ecological Economics 33(1):29-43. 
Knight, B. I. 2003. Environmental quality incentive program: Final rule. Federal 
Register 68(104):32337-32355. 
Kohn, A. 1993. The hidden cost of rewards. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin. 
107 
 
Korsching, P. F., and T. J. I. Hoban. 1990. Relationships between information sources 
and farmers' conservation perceptions and behavior. Society and Natural 
Resources 3:1-10. 
Kraft, S. E., C. Lant, and K. Gillman. 1996. WQIP: An assessment of its chances for 
acceptance by farmers. Journal of Soil and Water Conservation 51(6):494-499. 
Kreuter, U. P., H. E. Amestoy, M. M. Kothmann, D. N. Ueckert, W. A. McGinty, and S. 
R. Cummings. 2005. The use of brush management methods: A Texas landowner 
survey. Rangeland Ecology & Management 58(3):284-291. 
Kreuter, U. P., M. V. Nair, D. Jackson-Smith, J. R. Conner, and J. E. Johnston. 2006. 
Property rights orientations and rangeland management objectives: Texas, Utah, 
and Colorado. Rangeland Ecology & Management 59:632-639. 
Kreuter, U. P., M. R. Tays, and J. R. Conner. 2004. Landowner willingness to participate 
in a Texas brush reduction program. J Range Manag 57:230-237. 
Ladd, C. G., and L. Gass. 1999. Golden-cheeked warbler : Dendroica chrysoparia. ed. 
A. Poole and F. Gill. Vol. 420, The birds of North America. Philadelphia, PA: 
The Birds of North America. 
Land Trust Alliance. 2005. National land trust census report. Washington DC: Land 
Trust Alliance. 
Langpap, C. 2004. Conservation incentives programs for endangered species: An 
analysis of landowner participation. Land Economics 80(3):375-388. 
———. 2006. Conservation of endangered species: Can incentives work for private 
landowners? Ecological Economics 57(4):558-572. 
Liljeblad, A. 2003. Towards a more comprehensive understanding of trust: exploring the 
public's trust in natural resource management, University of Alaska, Fairbanks. 
Lockeretz, W. 1990. What have we learned about who conserves soil? Journal of Soil 
and Water Conservation 45(5):517-521. 
Long, J. S. 1997. Regression models for categorical and limited dependent variables. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
108 
 
Louviere, J. J., D. Hensher, and J. Swait. 2000. Stated choice methods: Analysis and 
application. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Louviere, J. J., T. Islam, N. Wasi, D. Street, and L. Burgess. 2008. Designing discrete 
choice experiments: Do optimal designs come at a price? Journal of Consumer 
Research 35(2):360-375. 
Lubowski, R. N., M. Vesterby, S. Bucholtz, A. Baez, and M. J. Roberts. 2006. Major 
uses of land in the United States, 2002. Washington DC: U.S. Department of 
Agriculture. 
Lueck, D., and J. A. Michael. 2003. Preemptive habitat destruction under the endangered 
species act. Journal of Law and Economics 46(1):27-60. 
Luzar, E. J., and A. Diagne. 1999. Participation in the next generation of agriculture 
conservation programs: The role of environmental attitudes. Journal of Socio-
Economics 28(3):335-349. 
Lynam, T., W. de Jong, D. Sheil, T. Kusumanto, and K. Evans. 2007. A review of tools 
for incorporating community knowledge, preferences, and values into decision 
making in natural resources management. Ecology and Society (1), 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol12/iss1/art5/. 
Magness, D. R., R. N. Wilkins, and S. J. Hejl. 2006. Quantitative relationships among 
golden-cheeked warbler occurrence and landscape size, composition, and 
structure. Wildl Soc Bull 34(2):473-479. 
Manfredo, M. J., D. C. Fulton, and C. L. Pierce. 1997. Understanding voter behavior of 
wildlife ballot initiatives : Colorado’s trapping amendment. Human Dimensions 
of Wildlife 2:22-39. 
Mann, C. C., and M. L. Plummer. 1995. Noah's choice: The future of endangered 
species. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
Manski, C. 1977. The structure of random utility models. Theory and Decisions 8:229-
254. 
McCleery, R. A., R. B. Ditton, J. Sell, and R. R. Lopez. 2006. Understanding and 
improving attitudinal research in wildlife sciences. Wildl Soc Bull 34(2):237-541. 
109 
 
McFadden, D. 1974. Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior. In 
Frontiers in econometrics, ed. P. Zarembka. New York: Academic Press. 
Mehmood, S. R., and D. Zhang. 2005. Determinants of forest landowner participation in 
the Endangered Species Act Safe Harbor Program. Human Dimensions of 
Wildlife 10(4):249 - 257. 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. 2005. Ecosystems and human well-being: 
Biodiversity synthesis. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute. 
Morey, E., J. Thacher, and W. Breffle. 2006. Using angler characteristics and attitudinal 
data to identify environmental preference classes: A latent-class model. 
Environmental and Resource Economics 34(1):91-115. 
Nagubadi, V., K. T. McNamara, W. L. Hoover, and W. L. Mills. 1996. Program 
participation behavior of nonindustrial forest landowners: A probit analysis. 
Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 28(2):323-336. 
Nature Conservancy, The. 2008. The Nature Conservancy in Texas Fort Hood off-post 
habitat protection  [Online]. The Nature Conservancy 2008 [cited June 28 2008]. 
Available from 
http://www.nature.org/wherewework/northamerica/states/texas/science/art16446.
html. 
Nimon, K., M. Lewis, R. Kane, and R. M. Haynes. 2008. An R package to compute 
commonality coefficients in the multiple regression case: An introduction to the 
package and a practical example. Behavior Research Methods 40:457-466. 
Norris, S. 2004. Only 30: A portrait of the endangered species act as a young law. 
Bioscience 54(4):288-294. 
Olenick, K. L., U. P. Kreuter, and J. R. Conner. 2005. Texas Landowner Perceptions 
Regarding Ecosystem Services and Cost-Share Land Management Programs. 
Ecological Economics 53:247-260. 
Olenick, K. L., R. N. Wilkins, and J. R. Conner. 2004. Increasing off-site water yield 
and grassland bird habitat in Texas through brush treatment practices. Ecological 
Economics 49(4):469-484. 
110 
 
Pager, D., and L. Quillan. 2005. Walking the talk? What employers say versus what they 
do. American Sociological Review 70:355-380. 
Parkhurst, G. M., and J. F. Shogren. 2003. Evaluating incentive mechanisms for 
conserving habitat. Natural Resources Journal 43:1093-1149. 
Paxton, P. 1999. Is social capital declining in the United States?  A multiple indicator 
assessment. In American Journal of Sociology: University of Chicago Press. 
Peak, R. G. 2004. Demography of the golden-cheeked warbler on Fort Hood, Texas, 
2004. In Endangered species monitoring and management at Fort Hood, Texas:  
2004 annual report, ed. The Nature Conservancy. Fort Hood, TX: The Nature 
Conservancy. 
Pekins, C. E. 2006. Of tanks and birds. Endangered Species Bulletin 31(2):4-7. 
Peterson, T. R., and C. C. Horton. 1995. Rooted in the soil: How understanding the 
perspectives of landowners can enhance the management of environmental 
disputes. Quarterly Journal of Speech 81(2):139-166. 
Pierce, W. D., J. Cameron, K. M. Banko, and S. So. 2003. Positive effects of rewards 
and performance standards on intrinsic motivation. The Psychological Record 
53:561-579. 
Pimentel, D., and U. Stachow. 1992. Conserving biological diversity in 
agricultural/forestry systems. Bioscience 42(5):354-362. 
Polasky, S., and H. Doremus. 1998. When the truth hurts: Endangered species policy on 
private land with imperfect information. Journal of Environmental Economics 
and Management 35(1):22-47. 
Queen, R. 2006. Wildlife conservation and the U.S. Army. Endangered Species Bulletin 
31(2):4-7. 
Raedeke, A. H., C. H. Nilon, and J. S. Rikoon. 2001. Factors affecting landowner 
participation in ecosystem management: A case study in south-central Missouri. 
Wildl Soc Bull 29(1):195-206. 
Rappaport Clark, J., and P. D. Dalton. 1999. Announcement of Final Safe Harbor Policy. 
Federal Register 64:32717-32726. 
111 
 
Raymond, L. 2006. Cooperation without trust: Overcoming collective action barriers to 
endangered species protection. Policy Studies Journal 34(1):37-57. 
Raymond, L., and A. Olive. 2008. Landowner beliefs regarding biodiversity protection 
on private property: An Indiana case study. Society & Natural Resources 
21(6):483-497. 
Reading, R. P., T. W. Clark, and S. R. Kellert. 1994. Attitudes and knowledge of people 
living in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem. Society & Natural Resources 
7(4):349-365. 
Reichwein Zientek, L., and B. Thompson. 2006. Commonality analysis: Partitioning 
variance to facilitate better understanding of data. Journal of Early Intervention 
28(4):299-307. 
Rhodes, R. E., and K. S. Courneya. 2003. Modelling the theory of planned behaviour 
and past behaviour. Psychology, Health & Medicine 8(1):57-69. 
Rogers, E. M. 1995. Diffusion of innovations. New York: Simon and Schuster. 
Rosenzweig, M. L. 2003. Reconciliation ecology and the future of species diversity. 
Oryx 37(2):194-205. 
Rowell, R. K. 1996. Partitioning predicted variance into constituent parts: How to 
conduct regression commonality analysis. In Advances in Social Science 
Methodology, ed. B. Thompson. Greenwich, CT: JAI. 
Scott, J. M., F. W. Davis, R. G. McGhie, R. G. Wright, C. Groves, and J. Estes. 2001. 
Nature reserves: Do they capture the full range of America's biological diversity? 
Ecol Appl 11(4):999-1007. 
Seibold, D. R., and R. D. McPhee. 1979. Commonality analysis: A method for 
decomposing explained variance in multiple regression analyses. Human 
Communication Research 5:355-365. 
Shen, S. 1987. Biological diversity and public policy. Bioscience 37:709-712. 
Shogren, J. F. 2005. Introduction. In Species at risk: Using economic incentives to 
shelter endangered species on private lands, ed. J. F. Shogren. Austin, TX: 
University of Texas Press. 
112 
 
Simonoff, J., S. 2003. Analyzing categorical data. New York: Springer. 
Smith, C. M., J. M. Peterson, and J. C. Leatherman. 2007. Attitudes of Great Plains 
producers about best management practices, conservation programs, and water 
quality. Journal of Soil and Water Conservation 62(5):97-103. 
Sorice, M. G., C. Oh, and R. B. Ditton. 2007. Managing scuba divers to meet ecological 
goals for coral reef conservation. Ambio 36(4):316-322. 
Spash, C. L., S. Stagl, and M. Getzner. 2005. Exploring alternatives for environmental 
valuation. In Alternatives for environmental valuation, ed. M. Getzner, C. L. 
Spash and S. Stagl. London: Routledge. 
Steelman, T. A. 2002. Community-based involvement in biodiversity protection in the 
United States. In Biodiversity, sustainability and human communities: Protecting 
Beyond the protected, ed. T. O'Riordan and S. Stoll-Kleeman. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Stein, B. A., L. S. Kutner, and J. S. Adams, eds. 2000. Precious heritage: The status of 
biodiversity in the United States. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Stein, B. A., C. Scott, and N. Benton. 2008. Federal lands and endangered species: The 
role of military and other federal lands in sustaining biodiversity. Bioscience 
58(4):339-347. 
Swait, J. 1994. A structural equation model of latent segmentation and product choice 
for cross-sectional revealed preference choice data. Journal of Retailing and 
Consumer Services 1(2):77-89. 
Texas A&M Institute for Renewable Natural Resources. 2008. Recovery credit system  
[On-line]. Texas A&M Institute for Renewable Natural Resources 2008 [cited 
July 21 2008]. Available from http://rcs.tamu.edu/. 
Texas Parks and Wildlife Department. 2004a. Black-capped vireo life history  [Online]. 
Texas Parks and Wildlife Department 2004 [cited May 24 2004]. Available from 
http://www.tpwd.state.tx.us/publications/. 
113 
 
———. 2004b. Management guidelines for black-capped vireo  [Online]. Texas Parks 
and Wildlife Department 2004 [cited May 24 2004]. Available from 
http://www.tpwd.state.tx.us/. 
Thompson, B., and G. M. Borrello. 1985. The importance of structure coefficients in 
regression research. Educational and psychological measurement 45:203-209. 
Thompson Jr., B. H. 2006. Managing the working landscape. In The Endangered Species 
Act at thirty, ed. D. D. Goble, J. M. Scott and F. W. Davis. Washington DC: 
Island Press. 
Thurow, A. P., J. R. Conner, T. L. Thurow, and M. D. Garriga. 2001. A preliminary 
analysis of Texas ranchers' willingness to participate in a brush control cost-
sharing program to improve off-site water yields. Ecological Economics 
37(1):139-152. 
Timmermans, H. 1984. Decompositional multiattribute preference models in spatial 
choice analysis: A review of some recent developments. Progress in Human 
Geography 8:189-222. 
Train, K. E. 2003. Discrete choice methods with simulation. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Travisi, C. M., and P. Nijkamp. 2008. Valuing environmental and health risk in 
agriculture: A choice experiment approach to pesticides in Italy. Ecological 
Economics 67(4):598-607. 
Trumbo, C., and G. O'Keefe. 2005. Intention to conserve water: Environmental values, 
reasoned action, and information effects across time. Society & Natural 
Resources 18(6):573-585. 
Tscharntke, T., A. M. Klein, A. Kruess, I. Steffan-Dewenter, C. Thies, and D. Andow. 
2005. Landscape perspectives on agricultural intensification and biodiversity -- 
ecosystem service management. Ecol Lett 8(8):857-874. 
Tuan, Y. F. 1980. Rootedness versus sense of place. Landscape 24:3-8. 
Vaske, J. J., and M. P. Donnelly. 1999. A value-attitude-behavior model predicting 
wildland preservations voting intentions. Society & Natural Resources 12(6):523. 
114 
 
Venkatachalam, L. 2008. Behavioral economics for environmental policy. Ecological 
Economics 67(4):640-645. 
Vermunt, J. K., and J. Magidson. 2005. Latent Gold Choice 4.0 user's manual. Belmont, 
MA: Statistical Innovations Inc. 
Vitousek, P. M., H. A. Mooney, J. Lubchenco, and J. M. Melillo. 1997. Human 
domination of earth's ecosystems. Science 277(5325):494-499. 
Wilkins, R. N. 2004. Phase I: The Leon River restoration project. Austin, TX: Texas 
Department of Agriculture. 
Wilkins, R. N., R. D. Brown, R. J. Conner, J. Engle, C. Gilliland, A. Hays, R. D. Slack, 
and D. W. Steinbach. 2003a. Fragmented lands: Changing land ownership in 
Texas. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University. 
Wilkins, R. N., A. Hays, D. Kubenka, D. W. Steinbach, W. Grant, E. Gonzalez, M. 
Kjelland, and J. Shackelford. 2003b. Texas rural lands: Trends and conservation 
implications for the 21st century. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University. 
Yaffee, S. L. 1982. Prohibitive policy: Implementing the federal Endangered Species 
Act. ed. M. Weinberg and B. Page, MIT studies in american politics and public 
policy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Zhang, D., and W. Flick. 2001. Sticks, carrots, and reforestation investment. Land 
Economics 77(3):443-456. 
Zhang, D., and S. R. Mehmood. 2002. Safe Harbor for the red-cockaded woodpecker: 
Private forest landowners share their views. Journal of Forestry 100(5):24-29. 
 
 
115 
 
VITA 
 
Name: Michael Gregory Sorice 
Address: 2258 TAMU, College Station, TX 77843-2258 
Email Address: msorice@tamu.edu 
Education: B.A., Zoology, Miami University, 1997 
 M.S., Recreation, Park & Tourism Sciences, Texas A&M University, 
2001 
 Ph.D., Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences, Texas A&M University, 2008 
 
 
 
 
